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Communication networks, even small ones, generate a huge amount of network
traffic every day. Furthermore, networking traffic can be captured to be either
analyzed at run-time or stored to be later inspected. Captured network traffic
packets include a lot of sensitive data that can be extracted. Traffic analysis
is the process of extracting useful/sensitive information from observed network
traffic. Typical use cases include Internet traffic classification, malware detection,
and website fingerprinting attacks. Given the large size of network traffic data,
the most important feature of efficient traffic analysis techniques is scalability.
The Internet is expanded every minute.
Machine learning techniques have shown promising results in traffic analy-
sis attacks, in particular, website fingerprinting. However, to be scalable, such
xi
techniques need parallel computation. Furthermore, network traffic classification
using machine learning performs poorly when the number of classes incorporated
in the training increases. In addition, it needs sufficient training samples in order
to produce good accuracy results. Consequently, high accuracy traffic analysis
techniques use heavy machine learning algorithms (e.g. SVM) making them not
applicable in large scale and real-time scenarios.
Recently, efficient tools in data fingerprinting have been developed to help
digital forensics investigators to identify artifacts within hard disk images with
Terabytes of data. Such techniques turned out very efficient and providing high
accuracy with a small false positive rate.
Inspired by digital forensics techniques, we propose a new network traffic analy-
sis approach based on similarity digest. The approach features several advantages
compared to existing techniques, namely, fast signature generation, a compact
signature representation using Bloom filters, efficient similarity detection between
packet traces of arbitrary sizes, etc. Experimental results show very promising
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Network traffic analysis is the process of capturing and examining network com-
munications in order to retrieve useful/sensitive information from the observed
traffic. It has been used since the early days of digital networking. Network
traffic contains a tremendous amount of information that can be extracted with
small effort compared to the other methods that can be used to extract the same
information. Using network traffic techniques requires only a sniffer positioned at
a central point to captured either every packet passes through the central point
or only once that matches specific filters. In contrary to other methods that re-
quire an agent to be installed on different places that have to be compatible with
the targeted environment, that the installed agent monitors. Based on the cap-
tured traffic, Network traffic analysis has been utilized for network management,
quality-of-service, law enforcement, and for security and privacy purposes. There
are at least three major use cases for traffic analysis: attacks on privacy(website
fingerprinting), network traffic classification, and malware traffic analysis.
1
1.1 Website fingerprinting
Traffic analysis is commonly used to attack privacy of users. Indeed, by carefully
analyzing users traffic, one can reveal sensitive information about the communica-
tion (e.g. session tokens, web browsing activity, etc.). Attacks on privacy can be
carried out by any entity having access to the traffic (local eavesdropper, gateway,
ISP, censorship entity, etc.). When carried out legally (government), such attack
is called Lawful Intercept (LI). One notable traffic analysis attack targeting user
privacy is website fingerprinting. The aim of the attack is to reveal the identity of
the website visited by the targeted user [1]. The attacker puts his effort trying to
figure out what type of content a given user is surfing over the internet when the
user is protecting himself with Privacy enhancing technologies such as single-hop
solutions (e.g. Stunnel, OpenSSH, CiscoVPN, OpenVPN, etc.) and mutli-hop
(e.g. Tor and JAP). Privacy enhancing technologies basically establish an en-
crypted tunnel/s. Therefore, all the network traffic are totally obfuscated. This
scenario can be vulnerable to local traffic analysis attacks. the attacker simply
should have access to a copy of the user’s network traffic either by tapping the
local link medium used by the victim or have access to the local gateway. Then,
the attacker can compare the sniffed filtered traffic to his previously labeled col-
lected database of network traffic, that are captured and filtered in a simulated
environment. In this scenario, the attacker does not try to decrypt the encrypted
traffic. Otherwise, he utilizes the statistical flaw features of the network headers’
traces such as size, inter-arrival-time etc to make his prediction. Evaluation of the
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Privacy enhancing technologies in [2] shows that Privacy enhancing technologies
such as single-hup solutions are weak whereas multi-hup solutions such as Tor and
JAP are resilient to website fingerprint attack. However, recent contribution in
[3] has achieved greater than 90 % detection rate; but to run their attack demo,
they used high performance parallel computing.
1.2 Network traffic classification
Another area of network traffic analysis in the literature focuses on traffic clas-
sification1 [4] which aims at associating traffic flows with the applications that
generated them (e.g. web browsing, VoIP, P2P, etc.). Recognizing accurately
which type of traffic is flowing through a network is very valuable for quality of
service (QoS) purposes. It allows network service providers to optimize the down-
load/upload speed depending on the type of the traffic. Other benefits of traffic
classification include a better understanding of the network utilization, dealing
with congestion problems, traffic accountability, etc.
1.3 Malware traffic detection
The third very important area of network traffic analysis is detecting the existence
of the malicious applications via network traffic. In particular, traffic analysis is
commonly used to detect malware and botnet infections [5]. Relying on network
traffic analysis to detect malware activity is very attractive since it allows to cover
1Also known as traffic identification
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a large number of hosts without requiring any of these hosts to install any software.
Malware becomes very sophisticated. By using obfuscation techniques in ad-
dition to borrowing rootkit services, malware can easily bypass the anti-malware.
Fortunately, even if the malware is able to hide its activities within the system;
it wont be able to hide their existence within the network. Malware that does
not communicate with their source; their damage is maintainable. Organizations
really terrified from malware that can successfully steal classified documents and
send them to their source.
During the war between malware authors and malware analysts, several method-
ologies/techniques have been developed to detect the existence of the malware
within the network traffic. Almost all methods used to classify application’s net-
work traffic have been used to identify the existence of malware within the network
traffic. Therefore, malware traffic detection suffers from the same limitations faced
by the network classification methods. Sophisticated malware, to bypass port-
based filtering, starts using dynamically allocated ports or hide themselves via
using popular ports such as HTTP port to bypass firewalls. Furthermore, they
use a secure protocol to decrypt their packet traffic. In addition, between now
and then, a new malware appears. Consequently, network traffic classifier will
not be able to recognize them. Another method used to detect malware traffic is
anomaly based detection technique that tries to learn traffic behavior in order to
differentiate between normal and abnormal network traffic. However, IDS suffers
from high false positive rate.
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Today, with the increased use of automated obfuscation tools, that are used
to generate multiple variants of malware, the number of the generated malware is
increased exponentially. Obfuscation tools purpose is to change syntax of malware
via inserting nulls, packing, code encryption etc. Consequently, resulted malware
will have different internal structure but has similar semantic behavior. Attackers
resort to these measure to avoid signature-based anti-malware as well as static
malware analysis. Indeed anti-malware fail to maintain an up-to-date database of
malware signatures. as a result, malware scanners suffers from high false positive
rate[6]. Furthermore, Moser et al. [7] had designed an obfuscation problem, that
is proved to be NP-hard to be detected by classical anti-malware signature as
well as by static analysis tools. This escalation from the malware authors triggers
researchers to develop behavioral countermeasure since it becomes impractical to
generate a signature for each malware. Behavioral malware clustering has two
approaches: monitor malware while being executed via observing CPU/memory
usage and system call, registry operations, setting a registry key and resource
allocation etc. to either create a signature from or to learn a model[8, 9, 10]. The
second approach monitor malware networking behavior such as protocol used,
packets’ features or flaw features etc. Behavioral approach utilized the idea that
variant obfuscated malware shares the same semantic behavior. Basically, behav-
ioral system will cluster malware that shares similar activities. Then, it decides
common features for each group to be used as their group signature . Conse-
quently, behavioral defense system would be able to catch almost all the malware
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variants. According to [11, 12] network behavioral system more attractive than
system level competitive one. First of all, it is easy to implement and deploy. Sec-
ond, it does not require to use virtualized environment as well as costly dynamic
analysis.
1.4 Traffic analysis historical phases
Traffic analysis techniques went through three major historical phases.
1.4.1 Port-based Technique
The first phase consists of using TCP/UDP port numbers to recognize identify
the type of the traffic or to define signatures. This simple approach suffers from
at least three limitations:
• Many applications increasingly avoid using non-registered IANA ports (un-
predictable ports)
• To avoid tagging, many applications use port numbers assigned to other
applications.
• With IPv4 address exhaustion, an increasing number of web servers are
offering various services through port address translation (PAT) sharing the
same public IP address but on different ports.
With these limitations, port-based traffic analysis is still very commonly used
due to its simplicity and efficiency.
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1.4.2 Payload-based Techniques
To address port-based traffic analysis limitations, payload-based techniques emerged2.
As its name indicates, it classifies the traffic by inspecting packets payloads look-
ing for application-specific data. In turn, payload-based techniques suffer from
the following limitations:
• Inspecting third-party packet payloads involves a significant privacy legal is-
sues. Typically, privacy laws prevents access to third-party packet payloads.
• Applications are increasingly using new and customized protocol and header
formats while packet inspection assumes the knowledge of payload syntax.
• Inspecting all packets payloads is computationally expensive.
• Applications are increasingly encrypting/obfuscating their traffic.
1.4.3 Pattern-based Techniques
The latest phase of traffic analysis evolution is pattern-based techniques which
do not require deep payload inspection [13]. Instead, these techniques rely on
statistical patterns in externally observable attributes of the traffic such as size,
direction, time delay, etc. Pattern-based techniques overcome all shortcomings of
payload-based techniques but are slightly less accurate. A key advantage is that
pattern-based techniques can still be usable if the traffic is encrypted/obfuscated.
2Also known as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).
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Table 1.1: Traffic Classification
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A large body of works in the literature focused on applying machine learning
techniques to network traffic in order to extract patterns from the traffic traces.
These patterns can then be used to recognize similar traces. On the downside,
existing pattern-based techniques suffer from the following limitations:
• They are good at checking if a sequence of packets matches a signature but
they are not suitable for telling if a large traffic trace contains the trace of
a specific item (e.g. website or malware).
• Being based on machine learning algorithms, they are not efficient enough
for real-time checking.
For the first limitation, consider the following common scenario. An entity
through which a huge amount of traffic is flowing (e.g. ISP) is trying to pinpoint
a specific artifact (e.g website, malware, etc.) in the traffic and in real-time.
Existing pattern-based traffic analysis techniques are not suitable for this task
because they work by matching each part of the traffic with each signature. The
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signature matching is based on comparing ”apples to apples”. That is, extracting
each time a limited sequence of packets and matching them with the signature.
For example, if a signature is generated from n packets, at each step, only around
n packets should be extracted from the traffic and matched with the signature.
In presence of a large number of artifacts (A bank of malware, a bank of websites,
etc.) with their signatures, keeping up with the real-time intake becomes quickly
infeasible.
For the second limitation, machine learning techniques, in particular SVM
based classifiers which produced the best results in the literature [18, 3], are
relatively slow. For example, Tao and Wang [3] resorted to using SHARCNET, a
Canadian academic consortium that offers high performance parallel computing.
Additionally, as has been noted previously [1], if the samples used for signature
generation are not fresh, the traffic analysis accuracy will decrease significantly.
Hence, to keep high accuracy levels, signatures have to be updated frequently. This
requires efficient signature generation in particular when the number of classes is
large (Websites, Malware, etc.).
1.6 Thesis contribution
This work can be seen as another contribution to pattern-based traffic analysis
but that addresses the above limitations. Unlike the majority of existing works in
the literature which apply machine learning techniques, we apply techniques from
digital forensics. The intuition behind our approach is that some algorithms from
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digital forensics try to solve problems very similar to traffic analysis problems. A
common scenario in data forensics is to check if a large search space (e.g. hard
disk) contains traces of source data (e.g. a picture file). This scenario has natural
resemblance with the problem of checking if a large amount of network traffic
contains traces of a specific artifact (e.g. website, malware etc).
Inspired by digital forensics technique proposed by [19, 20], We propose a
new network traffic analysis approach based on similarity digest (AHBM). The
approach features several advantages compared to existing techniques in network
traffic analysis, namely, fast signature generation, compact signature representa-
tion using Bloom filters, efficient similarity detection between objects of arbitrary
sizes, etc. To achieve my goal, We have customized approximate hash based
matching (AHBM), a recent and more flexible approach for similarity identifica-
tion which can accommodate various modifications (insertion, deletion, reorder-
ing, etc.) in the source data. Furthermore, AHBM tries to identify statistically-
improbable chunks of bytes and use them to compute the similarity between two
sources of data. Unlike simple hash based techniques, which support yes/no re-
sults, AHBM allows requests to be answered approximately, that is, with a value
between 0 and 100.
With customized similarity hashing (AHBM), We have addresses the above
two limitations of pattern-based approaches. First, signature generation is much
simpler, and consequently much faster, with AHBM, Second, hash based tech-
niques are efficient in presence of a large search space (typical scenario in digital
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forensics). The downside of using AHBM, however, is a slight decrease in the
traffic analysis accuracy. We show that by carefully tuning the parameters of
the AHBM algorithm, we could significantly improve the traffic analysis accuracy.
In the empirical analysis, We use four datasets representing the three major use
cases of traffic analysis, namely, Web browsing through VPN dataset, Web brows-
ing through Tor dataset,Web browsing through secure wireless network(WiFi),
and Malware traffic dataset. Experimental results show very promising results for
VPN, WiFi, and malware traffic, but low results for Tor traffic.
1.7 Thesis organization
The remaining of the document is organized as follows: Chapter 2, we go through
the literature review. In Chapter 3, we demonstrate how the similarity hashing
could be tailored in order to be used in network traffic analysis. In Chapter 4, we
evaluate our proposed approach via emulating website fingerprinting over secure
VPN. In addition, we show and evaluate the scalability of our proposed approach.
In Chapter 5, we further evaluate our approach over Tor network as well as secure
wireless network(WIFi) using website fingerprinting attack. In Chapter six, we
show how our proposed approach can be utilized to build behavioral malware
traffic detection system. In Chapter 7, we summarize our thesis work as well as




2.1 Network traffic classification
The first major use case of network traffic analysis is to classify Internet traffic.
Being able to identify the type of traffic flowing through the network allows service
providers to prioritize, protect, or prevent certain types of traffic. Dainotti et al. [4]
provide a state of the art of traffic classification and point to key issues and future
directions in the field. In particular, they mention the difficulty to collect large and
reliable data for traffic classification benchmarking. The obstacles to collect and
share such data sets are mainly the privacy and sensitivity of the traces. Without
such sharable benchmarks it is difficult to validate and compare the efficiency of
proposed algorithms.
The simplest and historically the most commonly used technique for traffic
classification is port-based [21]. Classification is based on the source and/or des-
tination port numbers. This technique assumes that the applications are using
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well-known TCP and UDP ports consistently [22]. As mentioned in the previous
section, this approach has several limitations [23], in particular, some applica-
tions do not have registered port numbers (e.g. P2P services), some applications
are using other applications port numbers, and some web service providers are
using port address translation (PAT) to share the same public IP address. Port-
based approach is by far the fastest traffic classification technique and it is still
commonly used in practice (when accuracy is not important).
High accuracy traffic classification can be reached with payload-based tech-
niques (DPI) which consist in inspecting packet payloads in order to identify the
type of the traffic. Several open source (L7-Filter [24], nDPI [25], ntopng [26],
libprotoident [27]) and commercial (CloudShield [28], NetFlow [29], NBAR [30])
payload-based traffic analysis tools are available in the market. Each one of these
tools come with a database of signatures that capture the pattern of each type
of traffic. Traffic classification is achieved by matching the payload of each ob-
served packet with the database signatures. Karagiannis et al. [21] were the first
to generate packet payload signatures (P2P applications). However, the signature
generation is based on protocol reverse engineering and is mainly manual. Most
of subsequent contributions focused on automating the signature generation pro-
cess [31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. As mentioned previously, payload-based techniques suffer
from four major drawbacks, namely, efficiency (inspecting all packets payloads is
computationally expensive), privacy (access to third party packet payloads is ille-
gal), new protocols syntax (new protocols with different syntax are quickly emerg-
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ing), and encryption (the approach is ineffective with encryption/obfuscation).
Pattern-based traffic analysis techniques overlook port numbers as well as pay-
load content and focus on statistical and externally observable properties of the
traffic that can be extracted by examining only TCP/IP headers. Since Frank
[36] showed how machine learning can be used in intrusion detection, machine
learning became a major approach for pattern-based traffic analysis. Nguyen et
al.[13] survived the stat-of-the-art approaches proposed in network traffic clas-
sification using machine learning techniques. It mentioned the applications of
machine learning classification in Quality of service, network management, law
enforcement and security. Furthermore, it outlines the evaluation metrics used to
evaluate proposed network classification models. what is needed to build network
classification module using machine learning? What features have been used so
far in stat-of the-art of network traffic classification? The survived papers are
categorized according to the machine learning strategy used either supervised
or unsupervised as well as how they contribute to these field. It also addresses
the challenge of building a real-time classifier model. Furthermore, it mentioned
the area of integrating the supervised and unsupervised learning techniques in
order to automate the network classification process. The features used in the
surveyed works are packet length statistics, byte counts, connection duration,
Fourier transform of packet, inter-arrival time, size of TCP/IP control fields, to-
tal number of pushed packets, total number of ACK packets, average inter packet
gap etc. Zhang et al.[37] proposed a non-parametric approach to network traffic
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classification. They incorporated the flow correlation in to supervised learning
classification. BoF- bag of flows - is used to model the flow correlation. They
conducted the correlation analysis on three-tuple heuristic dst-ip; dst-port; Pro-
tocol. They evaluated their work in two datasets. They show that supervised
classification incorporated with flow correlation outperform NN, SVM and Neural
nets classifiers. They further show that classification with correlation can perform
constantly even when trained with small training data samples. Zhang et al.[38]
proposed a new scheme to tackle zero-day application classification. The new
scheme basically utilizes both supervised classification and clustering techniques.
Therefore, it has the capability to discriminate among pre-known applications and
zero-day applications. Their proposed scheme consists of three modules: unknown
discovery utilizing clustering, and BoF based classification using flow correlations
and system update. Furthermore, they propose a new method that intelligently
optimizes the proposed scheme parameters. They test their proposed scheme
against six different datasets; each dataset has been collected at different time,
different location using different network media types. Finally, their evaluation
showed that their proposed scheme outperforms the four state-of-the-art meth-
ods: one-class SVM, semi-supervised clustering, correlation-based classification,
and random forest. Currently, machine learning based classifier implementations
include Tstat [15], TIE [17], MTClass [39], and CoMo [14] (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1: Traffic Classification
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2.2 Malware traffic detection
Pattern-based techniques have been extensively used for network malware detec-
tion [5]. The work of Livadas et al. [40] is a typical example of pattern-based
malware detection where models are learned from a testbed environment with
virtual machines. The classification is based on relatively simple set of features,
namely, duration of the flow, average bytes per packet per flow, average bits per
second per flow, variance of packet inter-arrival time for flow, etc.
Boukhtout et al.[41] propose malware traffic detection using machine learning.
They have employ five different classification techniques -J48, Boosted J48, Naive
Bayesian (NB), Boosted NB, and SVM. They use IP level features proposed by
[42, 43], that have been proposed to classify VoIP traffic over an encrypted channel.
The five created classifier has been trained and tested using two datasets. The
first dataset consists of malware traffic, that has been collected in a controlled
environment using GFI sandbox. For one year they have executed 1.5 million
different malware. They end up with 100000 pcap files labeled with the name of
malware’s hash. the second dataset used to represent benign traffic; they basically
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use the benign part of DARPA dataset. Their evaluation showed that J48 and
Boosted J48 achieved the superior malware detection rate approached 99% with
less that 1 % false positive. However, when they tried with known malware
samples (Zeus, etc.) with a smaller dataset, they obtained lower rates.
Nelms et al.[44] propose a new approach named ExecScent to detect botnets
that use http protocol to communicate their C&C. They state that their solution
learns from the known C&C botnet communication to identify the existence of
new http C&C botnet as long as the newly discovered botnet has shared com-
munication behavior of the previously known botnet. The approach basically
starts by learning itself from previously known botnet samples. It automatically
generates a signature template for known malware sample via locating the initial
communication of the botnet sample. Therefore, the generated template can be
employed at the edge of the network to detect exact or similar botnets. They
have evaluated their proposed solution on three large networks. Consequently,
they were able to detect many new botnets in addition to discovering hundreds
of newly infected machine. There result outperform up to date commercial C&C
domain blacklist. However,the approach is quite classic because it relies on the
content of the packets.
BotMiner [45] is a general framework able detect botnet regardless of its type,
its structure, or its communication protocol. BotMiner main objective is to detect
a group of infected machines with botnet within the target network. It utilizes
the fact that bots usually behave in a similar manner due to the deterministic
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nature of the programs behavior. It functions as the following: it clusters similar
connections together at one side, and similar malicious activities on the other side,
then it performs cross cluster correlation trying to find hosts that share the two
clusters. Such finding is an indication of an existence of members of a botnet.
BotSnifer[46] targets centralized botnet structures that use either IRC or
HTTP protocols. BotSnifer is anomaly network detection system employ cor-
relation and similarity and statistics algorithms to detect activities and responses
patterns issued by the infected bots, taking the advantage of the preprogrammed
nature of the software installed on the infected machines.
The more recent BotFinder system [47] used five different flow-based features,
namely, average time interval between flows, average duration of flows, average
number of bytes in each direction (source and destination), and fourier transor-
mation over flow start times. However, unlike other malware detection systems,
BotFinder uses a computed score to find matchings in test traffic.
Rossow and Dietrich [48], through ProVex system, deal with encrypted mal-
ware communications differently: packets are decrypted using brute-force. Then,
botnet signatures are expressed in terms of probabilities to have specific bytes
at specific positions inside the packets (e.g. byte C4 occurs at position 47 with
probability 0.8). The approach has two drawbacks: it works only for botnets us-
ing simple encryption (e.g. XOR, etc.) and it requires plain text (not encrypted)
training samples to learn the botnet signatures. To overcome this latter draw-
back, Gu et al. [49, 45, 46] intersect two types of data inputs: network traffic
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Table 2.2: Malware Traffic Analysis
Paper Classifier Features Application and
Accuracy
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and host activity. The two data inputs are intersected to compute a score of the
likelihood for a host to be infected. The similarity between flows is computed
using several traffic features: number of packets per flow (ppf), average number
of bytes per packet (bpp), average number of bytes per second (bps), etc. The
main problem of this approach is that the clustering is too coarse-grained: the
traffic volume is huge and the obtained flows are too long even with extensive
filtering and white-listing. In addition, the approach depends on having several
hosts infected in the same network so that similarities can be detected. Notable
traffic analysis techniques for malware detection are summarized in Table 2.2.
Another direction of malware traffic analysis is interesting in clustering mal-
ware sharing similar behavior into groups in order to generate a general signature
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for these group of malware. Researchers put their intentions on these area when
they clearly found that classical signature based anti-malware detection as well
as static analysis are not enough in capturing polymorphic and obfuscated mal-
ware. Moser et al. [7] had design a 3SAT obfuscation problem to demonstrate the
difficulty of the obfuscation problem in the area of static analysis and signature
based anti-malware. Konrad et al.[9] use machine learning to train a model over
the behavioral features extracted from reports generated by sandbox environment.
Then, based on the weights generated by the learned model, they demonstrate
the most important features used the learned model. The main issue with their
contribution is with their reliance on inaccurate anti-malware labels.
Network-based approaches for malware detection have the advantage of cover-
ing a large number of hosts without requiring these hosts to install any software.
This makes deployment easier and incurs no performance penalty for end users.
one prominent work in this area presented by Perdisci et al.[50]. They propose
and implement a behavioral clustering system to group unlabeled similar that
uses HTTP protocol as a way of communication and similar networking activi-
ties. Their proposed system looks into a pool of HTTP malware’s traffic samples
and reveal similarities among malware samples. Then it prepare extracted features
in a suitable format accepted by Token-Subsequences algorithm[53] to generate
signature in snort format. To achieve their goal, they employ multi-clustering
refinement. At the beginning, they utilize statistical properties of HTTP features
such HTTP requests’ numbers, GET request Numbers, Post request numbers etc.
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Then fine-grained clustering used over structural resemblance among consecutive
HTTP request (Get,Post,Header etc). After that, the centroid of the resulted
clusters are represented as a set of the network signatures. Each summarizing its
related HTTP traffic generated by the malware in the cluster. The main issue
with Perdisci contribution is that, it only work over HTTP traffic while mal-
ware now a day uses diverse communication protocols. Furthermore, it will be
come useless when HTTP traffic goes over an encrypted tunnels. To remedy the
first limitation, zubair et al. [54] propose a tools named FIRMA which able to
extract malwrar traffic signature from a pool of malware traffic samples that use
diverse communication protocols such as HTTP, IRC, SMTP, TCP,UDP). Firstly,
it cluster unlabelled malware that share similar behavior into families. Then it
generate a general signature for each family. Since it is hard to create a general
network traffic signature for all malware. Doing so will end up with high false
positive rate. Finally, their generated signature are printed in two well known
IDS format-Snort and Suricata to be used in real time system. Even though, they
show that their proposed tool are 4.5 more faster than the implemented approach
proposed by Perdisci[50]. Then perdisci etl al [55] improve their previous work
[50] to make their clustering system scalable, they have replaced the hierarchical
clustering approach, that they have used previously, with popular incremental
clustering algorithm (BIRCH ) which is more efficient with big dataset. This
new implementation has reduced the processing time from several hours into few
minutes. Even though proposed network behavioral clustering system show very
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high accuracy in grouping unlabeled families into groups, they still useless when
network payloads are encrypted because both proposed approaches relies on fea-
tures extracted from used protocol structure. therefore, they suffer from the same
limitation faced by payload based detection mentioned earlier.
2.3 Website fingerprinting
Users of anonymity systems (e.g. Tor [56]) are increasingly the target of traffic
analysis attacks which threatens their privacy. In particular, website fingerprinting
is a variant of pattern-based traffic analysis aiming at revealing the identities of
websites accessed by users.
Herrmann et al.[2]applied the test data mining techniques to fingerprint the
web sites. This work target the following privacy enhancing technologies: single-
hup such as Stunnel, OpenSSH, CiscoVPN, OpenVPN and mutli-hup such as Tor
and JAP. They have used the normalized distribution of the IP packet size and
direction as features. The have employs the multinomial naive-bayes classifier
on the extracted features. The dataset used for training and testing has been
generated by the authors in a controlled environment. This contribution shows a
remarkable achievement on a single-hup. However, it shows very poor results on
multi-hup techniques.
Panchenko et al.[57] employ the support vector machine to show a possible
websites fingerprint attack in both Tor and JAP anonymity solutions. They play
with the following features: volume, time and direction of the IP packet of each
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sample. They start by test each feature individually. Then the combine each
features altogether. Consequently, they have achieved 50 % and 80% in Tor and
JAP respectively. After that, they launched open world experiment; they have
achieved 73% true positive and 0.05 false positive in Tor.
Cai et al. [18] proposes a new attack towards website fingerprints. The idea
of the attack basically works as the following: firstly, network traffic traces are
transformed into strings. Then, Damerau-Levenshtein distance is used to com-
pare between the generated strings. This attack has been evaluated against, SSH
tunnel, SSH integrated with HTTPOS, SSH with Sample-based morphing, Tor
and Tor with randomized pipelining. Furthermore, they compared their meth-
ods against previously published papers in this field. Their attack method scores
80% success rate of 100 web pages dataset. In addition, they have extended their
proposed web pages classifier to create a website classifier using HMM.
Wang and Goldberg [3] proposed a new website fingerprint attack. They em-
ploy SVM with their new proposed distance metrics. They derived their distance
metrics from the way how web pages are loaded. The novelty of this work is
that; they work with Tor cell traces instead of IP packet traces. Each tor cell
consists of 512 bytes. Furthermore, the delete every SENDME cell traces that
used by the Tor to instruct command. To evaluate their attack, they conducted
two experiments: closed-world scenario and open-world scenario. They proposed
a new procedure to create dataset to evaluate website fingerprint against Tor. In
the closed-world experiment, they used the 100 Alexa websites URLs each with
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Table 2.3: Website fingerprinting Classifiers
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Wang and Gold-
berg [3]
SVM with a fast
variant of Leven-
stein distance
Tor Cells 91% on Tor traffic
40 instances. Then they apply 10-cross fold validation. As a result, they achieve
91% precessions. In the open-world scenario, they use four web sites each with
40 instances. Then, the testing phase consists of trying to identify visits to those
websites in the middle of 860 other website visits chosen from the top 1000 Alexa
websites. The precision was also around 90%. Training the SVM is very process-
ing intensive, therefore the authors used a high-performance parallel computing
by the Canadian academic consortium. The authors proposed a fast version of
their classifier which runs much quickly than the regular one but with slightly less
precision.
The most recent contributions focused on Tor anonymity protocol and showed
very promising precision results are summarized in (Table 2.3).
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2.4 Similarity hashing
In digital forensics, most of the tools used to determine similarity of binary data
use hashing. Vassil Roussev [59] went through the history of data fingerprint and
its application so far and predict for promising future of similarity hashing uses in
digital forensic. In 1981, Michael Rabin[60] has utilized the random polynomial
to design a real-time string matching algorithm to detect unauthorized changes to
files. Later, his work has been extended to improve pattern matching [61]. These
research got interest after that. Consequently, several applications showed up such
as sif tool for Unix to measure similarities among text files [62], copy-detection
scheme [63], and detect similarities among Web pages [64].
One major area of our interest that utilize data fingerprinting is Payload at-
tribution systems (PASs), which are a major area of network forensics. PAS
basically take the packets’ traces, take their digest hashes, store those hashes,
then it provides a look up interface used to inquiry the existence of a specific byte
sequence. In practice, normally Bloom Filter used as a data structure for PDAs
implementation. It has been Implemented in different flavor: hierarchical Bloom
filters (HBFs)[65], rolling Bloom filter (RBF)[66] and spam filtering [67].
Another pioneered work of fingerprint related to our work named Autograph
[67]. Autograph is a spam filter tool. It is the first work that employs data
fingerprinting approaches. It utilizes the Rabin scheme [60]. First, it separates
suspicious TCP flows from innocuous ones. Then, It breaks the input network
traces into blocks. Then, it computes the most likely statistical ones, and finally
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hashing them using Rabin fingerprint.
A first implemented similarity hashing called fuzzy hashing or similarity hash-
ing [68]. It utilizes the idea behind the spam filter work Autograph. Fuzzy hashing
simply works as the following: First, it dived provided stream data in equal blocks,
after that it create a hashed for each block-basically 6-digest. Finally, it combines
all the blocks hashes as a one-line string, which is base64 encoded. To see whether
two objects have similarities or not, it compares the string hashes of the two ob-
jects using edit distance measure. Finally, it produces result as a score between
0 and 100. This approach is not suitable to estimate similarity between traffic
traces because a simple bit insertion or deletion anywhere in the data turn all
block hashes different.
After that, Roussev propose a new similarity hashing data fingerprint tool
named sdhash [19, 20]. It also called approximate hash based matching (AHBM).
It works by selecting features that are statically impossible to happen by accident.
Selecting the statistically improbable features consists in picking the features with
the lowest precedence values. The precedence score is proportional to how common
the corresponding entropy value is found in the data. That is, if a feature has a
very common normalized entropy (Hnorm) value, it gets a high value; Whereas
features with low Hnorm values will get small Sprec values.finally, selected features
are represented by consecutive Bloom filters. Computing the similarity between
two data objects consists in comparing their Bloom filters. Hence, the core of the
similarity computation process is the comparison of two Bloom filters which is
26
based on a modified version of Hamming distance. Hamming distance measures
the minimum number of substitutions required to change one object into the
other distance. A detailed explanation of this approach as well as how We have
customized its heart of internal implementation to be suitable in network traffic
analysis field is elaborated in chapter three.
ssdeep and sdhash have common objective but they use different methodolo-
gies. They Intend to check the similarity between two objects using data finger-
printing approach. Roussev [69] had conducted experiments to test the capability
of both ssdeep and sdhash-our customized used tool(AHBM). The experiments
showed that sdhash is capable of identifying the existence of an embed object on
the target object, regardless of the size of target object that contains an embedded
object. On contrary with ssdeep; it is incapable to identify the existence of an
embed object on the target object as long as the size of the embedded object is
less than the one-third of the size of targeted object. For example, ssdeep is not
capable of identifying the existence embedded jpg image which it average size 143
KB within a targeted document (doc/pdf/ppt/xls) that their size is in between
516-1,982 KB.
In a more recent work, Jang et al. [10] used feature hashing to identify similar-
ities between malware binaries. Each malware binary is split into 16 bytes blocks
(n-grams). These n-grams are hashed and for each malware a bitvector is gener-
ated to indicate if a feature is present or not (0 or 1). Unlike Bloom filters which
use several hash functions, feature hashing uses only one hash function. Finally,
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Jaccard similarity computed on bitvectors is used for malware clustering. The im-
plemented system, BitShred, has similar accuracy to existing malware clustering
systems, but is much more faster.
2.5 Gap analysis
Based on the literature, we have presented earlier, we cover these gaps:
1. No previous work has tailored similarity hashing approach into pattern-
based network traffic analysis.
We tailored the similarity hashing approach to work on the most stable
network packets’ features- packet length, direction, and order- to train our
final network traffic analysis models.
2. No previous work has used similarity hashing to evaluate privacy enhancing
technologies.
To evaluate privacy enhancing technologies, we have emulated a well-known
privacy attack named website fingerprinting over Secured VPN, secured
wireless network(WiFi) and Tor browser.
3. No previous pattern-based network traffic analysis proposed solution suit-
able for telling if a large traffic trace contains a trace of a specific item (e.g.
website or malware)
4. No previous work has employed similarity hashing approach to cluster mal-
ware into groups based on malware’s network traffic behavior.
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we have utilized similarity hashing comparisons equations as a metric dis-




Considering the gaps discussed earlier, in this section 2.5, we have formulated the
following research question:
• RQ1 : Can similarity Hashing be used in network traffic analysis?
– RQ1.1 :How similarity hashing approach could be tailored in order to
be used in network traffic analysis fields?
• RQ2 : Can Similarity hashing solution -network traffic version- are efficient
against privacy enhancing technologies?
– RQ2.1 :How similarity hashing solution -network traffic version- models
are going to be trained and tested?
– RQ2.2: Does the similarity hashing solution- network traffic version-
offer scalability?
• RQ3 : Can similarity hashing solution emulate finding a needle in a haystack
scenario -network traffic version?
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• RQ4 : How similarity hashing solution- network traffic version- can be uti-
lized in malware traffic detection?
Considering RQ1, similarity hashing has been previously employed in network
traffic analysis. However, it was incorporated as payload-based inspection solution
while our proposed solution is considered under the umbrella of pattern-based
techniques. As our work, in Autograph [67], signatures are hashes of traffic data
blocks. Another similarity is that they carried out an experimental analysis of
the different parameters of the system (size of block, percentage of covered flows,
etc.) to optimize their values. However, Autograph deviates from our approach
in four main aspects. First, the signatures are formed by simply concatenating
selected block hashes, while we use the more efficient bloom filters representation.
Second, the most frequent blocks are selected as features, while in our case we
select the least frequent blocks as features. Third, it is applicable on plain-text
data (not encrypted), in particular HTTP traffic, while our technique is applicable
for plain-text as well as encrypted traffic. Fourth, the system is tailored to only
worm detection1 while ours is usable for any traffic analysis task, in particular,
malware detection, traffic classification, and website fingerprinting.
Considering RQ2, according to our knowledge no previous work has used sim-
ilarity hashing over privacy enhancing technologies.
Considering RQ3, a large body of works in the literature focused on applying
machine learning techniques to network traffic in order to extract patterns from
the traffic traces. The existing pattern-based techniques suffer from that, they are
1Autograph does not work for typical malware.
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not suitable for telling if a large traffic trace contains the trace of a specific item
(e.g. website or malware).
Considering RQ4, similarity hashing has been previously used to fingerprint
and cluster malware. Similarity hashing was employed over malware’s executable
binary files while our approach utilizes only the malware exchanged packets fea-
tures to cluster malware.







Most of the existing pattern-based traffic analysis techniques learn a model/signature
for each class (website, malware, etc.) using a set of labelled traffic samples for
each class. The signature is then used to identify occurrences of that class in
unknown traffic. The signature is expressed in terms of data features such as the
packet lengths, packets direction, total number of packets in each direction, etc.
For example, in presence of n features, using SVM consists in considering each
labelled sample as a point in the n-dimensional space and trying to find separating
hyperplanes that maximize the gaps between classes. Hence, models tend to be
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complex and require non-trivial computations.
Finding similarities between data objects 1 is a typical problem in digital foren-
sics. A typical scenario consists in looking for a similarity between a reference data
object (image or office document) and a target data object under investigation
(live memory dump, captured traffic dump, etc.). Compared to the previously
mentioned traffic analysis techniques, the ones used in digital forensics are sim-
pler but more scalable. It is important to note that digital forensics techniques
are based on string comparison where each data object is considered as a string
of bytes. Hence measuring similarity is based on string matching.
Hashing is very common forensics tool for string matching. A typical use case
is when checking the integrity of a whole target (file, sequence of packets, etc.) by
comparing before-and-after states of the file. Simple hashing is considered a good
compression mechanism since it allows to generate a unique fixed-size signature
for data objects of any size. However, if the goal is to discover occurrences of only
parts of the reference data object in the target data object, simple hashes are not
suitable. Instead, a common method is to increase the hashes’ granularity. That
is, splitting the reference and target data objects into smaller blocks, hash each
one of them, and keep a list of hashes for both data objects. Finding matches
between hashes indicate the same block is occurring as-is in the reference and
target data objects.
Simple hashing, regardless of its granularity, has two limitations. First, it
1In this discussion, we refer to the first and second data object as reference and target
respectively.
34
allows to pinpoint occurrences of exact copies. Any alteration (even 1 bit) yields
a hash mismatch. This problem is also known as hash fragility. Second, hashed
blocks should be aligned the same way in the reference and target data objects.
Any displacement in block boundaries yields a hash mismatch.
To address the hash fragility problem, data fingerprinting [60] is typically used
to find similar objects instead of exact object copies. The idea is to select a set of
representative features for each object, then the similarity is computed in terms
of the level of correlation between the features. Data fingerprinting is known to
be resilient to small alterations.
To address the block alignment problem, a technique called Winnowing [70] is
used. Winnowing works as follows. Assuming the block size is k and starting from
the beginning of the data object, for each sequence of k consecutive characters,
compute the hash and store it in an array. Hence, the first entry of the array is
the hash of the characters from 1 to k, while the second entry is the hash of the
characters from 2 to k+ 1, and so on. Then, using a sliding window select a hash
for each window position.
Using data fingerprinting and Winnowing raises three important questions:
1. how features are selected from a data object?
2. how features are stored efficiently?
3. how the correlation/similarity between two sets of features is measured?
Before discussing these questions and how we address them in the context of
traffic analysis, we need to define the data object and data feature terms. A data
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Figure 4.1: Data Object and Data Feature.
object is a sequence of packets corresponding to a specific network activity (e.g.
website visit, malware communication session, video communication session, etc.).
For each sequence, only the following information is kept: packet lengths, packet
order, and packet directions. This ”meta-data” information is available even if the
traffic is encrypted. A data feature is a sub-sequence of packets in a data object.
Figure 4.1 shows a snippet of a data object with the first three data features.
The proposed traffic analysis technique is based on data fingerprinting and win-
nowing and is inspired by Roussev’s approach of data fingerprinting with similarity
digests [19, 20]. Using this approach, the short answers to the above questions
are as follows. Given a data object (e.g. samples of a website visit), the technique
aims at selecting features (Question 1) that are least likely to occur in other data
objects (e.g. samples of a different website visits) by chance. Selected features are
then hashed and stored using Bloom filters (Question 2) which allow significantly
compact representation and fast membership queries. Hence, each data object
will be represented by a Bloom filter. Measuring the correlation/similarity of two
data objects (Question 3) consists in comparing their Bloom filter representations.
Full details of the approach is provided in the next sections.
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The proposed traffic analysis approach has several attractive advantages:
• Generating the signature of a class of traffic (website, malware, etc.) is very
efficient.
• A signature can be generated using a few number of samples without signif-
icantly decreasing the detection accuracy (As an extreme case, a signature
can be generated based on a single sample).
• Signature representation is very compact since it is using Bloom filters.
• Similarity can be computed efficiently between data objects of arbitrary
sizes.
• It removes the need to split the traffic in order to match a given signature
(Splitting problem [71]).
In the light of these advantages, the proposed approach can be applied at a
new level of scalability. A typical use case can be an attacker through which
a huge amount of traffic is flowing (e.g. ISP) and who is trying to pinpoint a
specific type of session (e.g website, malware, etc.) in the traffic and in real-time.
In addition, updating the bank of signatures can be done quickly and without
requiring a large number of samples.
4.2 Hash-based signature generation
Our approach’s signature generation process is based on data fingerprinting [60].
Given a set of samples of a specific network communication (website visit, malware
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communication, etc.), data fingerprinting consists in selecting a set of features that
uniquely identify that specific data network communication. For example, if the
samples correspond to facebook website visits, selected features should have a
high probability to be part of facebook visit samples, but a low probability to be
part of other traffic samples. The criteria we use for selection and that satisfies
these requirements is the following: choosing uncommon (statistically improbable)
features that happen to be part of the available samples. In order to characterize
common and uncommon features, two approaches are possible: using entropy
measure or a hash function.
4.2.1 Feature entropy vs feature hash
In order to characterize statistically improbable features, Roussev [19, 20] used
entropy values. Entropy measures the amount of information contained in the
data. Intuitively, it measures the level of uncertainty in the data. For example,
a feature composed of repeated packet lengths in the same direction results in a
relatively small entropy value.
Let {X1, X2, .., XB} denotes the sequence of packets of a feature F . The en-
tropy of the feature F is defined as follows:
E(F ) = −
∑
i
P (Xi) log2 P (Xi) (4.1)
where P (Xi) is the empirical probability of Xi in the string of packets. P (Xi) is
proportional to the number of times it is repeated in the feature. For example,
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consider the following small feature F1: {1392,−56, 56, 204,−56, 204,−115, 204}.
The alphabet of the feature is composed of 5 different packet items 1392,−56, 56, 204,
and−115. The empirical probability for every symbol is: P (1392) = 0.125, P (−56) =
0.25, P (56) = 0.125, P (204) = 0.375, P (−115) = 0.125. Using Equation (4.1)
results in the value H(F1) = 2.155. The maximum entropy value is obtained when
all bytes of the feature are different, that is, log2B.
To simplify processing and in order to make the entropy value independent
from the size of the feature (B), a normalized entropy value is used:
Enorm(F ) = b1000 × H(F )/ log2Bc (4.2)
The normalized entropy leads a value between 0 and 1000 regardless of the length
B of the feature.
On the positive side, entropy values are easy to compute and can be normalized
to values between 0 and 1000. On the negative side, entropy measure does not
take into consideration the order of the packets. That is, two features with the
same set of packets but in different order produce the same entropy value. For
example, F2: {56, 1392, 204,−56, 204,−56,−115, 204} produces the same entropy
value as F1 (E(F1) = E(F2) = 2.155) since they share the same set of packets,
but in different order.
Since in our traffic analysis scenario, the order of packets is important, we use
instead a hash function to characterize features. For every feature, a SHA-1 digest
is computed. In order to map the 160 bits SHA-1 digest to a value between 0 and
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1000, we consider only the 10 rightmost bits.
Hnorm(F ) = 2
first10bits(SHA−1(F )) (4.3)
Both entropy and hash functions lead to mapping conflicts (several different
features mapping to the same value). Entropy measures are slightly faster to
compute, but with hashing, packet order is preserved.
4.2.2 Feature selection criteria
A data object of length L packets contains L−B+1 features. Data fingerprinting
approach consists in selecting only a subset of these features to uniquely identify
the data object. A good feature candidate for selection should satisfy two criteria:
• criteria 1: it should be statistically improbable
• criteria 2: it should be part of most of (or all) data samples
For criteria 1, the statistical probability of a feature depends on the likelihood
of its normalized hash value. To this end, we estimate the probability distribution
of all possible normalized hash values [0, 1000]. For example, Figure 4.2 shows the
empirical probability density function for website browsing through VPN dataset
and Tor dataset(Cai’s dataset) in addition to malware dataset. The dataset is
generated by automatically fetching the Alexa’s top 100 websites through VPN
40 times. For each feature in the data object, we compute its normalized SHA-1
digest and use the value to identify its statistical probability from the distribution.
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Figure 4.2: Probability density function of normalized Hash values for VPN web
browsing dataset, Cai’s tor dataset and malware dataset.
This is implemented by a rank table of size 1000 mapping normalized hash values
to a precedence score (Sprec) which is a value between 0 and 1000 proportional
to the probability value. It is important to note that a different rank table is
generated for each type of traffic. For the sake of our experimental analysis, 3
rank tables have been generated from 3 different datasets:
• Web browsing through VPN dataset
• Malware traffic dataset
• Web browsing through Tor dataset
This technique of selecting statistically improbable feature using empirical prob-
ability density functions is discussed in details by Roussev [20].
For every feature, the precedence score indicates how common the correspond-
ing normalized hash value is found in the empirical data. That is, if a feature has
a very common Hnorm value, it gets a high Sprec value. Whereas features with
low Hnorm values will get low Sprec values. Selecting the statistically-improbable
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Figure 4.3: Computing the popularity score (Spop) on a data sample of size 28
packets and using a sliding window of size 9.
features consists in picking the features with the lowest Sprec values. A straight-
forward approach consists in ordering all the data features across the data object
in ascending order of their Sprec values and choosing the top ones. oThe problem
is that all selected features will originate from the same region/cluster of the data
object. Winnowing [70] technique uses a sliding window to pick features with local
minima. This guarantees that features are selected from various locations in the
data object.
Let W be the window size. While the window is sliding across the data, a
feature with the lowest Sprec is marked
2 at every step. If the same feature is
marked a number of times (1 ≤ k ≤ W ), it can be considered as a feature with a
local Sprec minimum and consequently selected as statistically improbable. This
is achieved by maintaining a popularity counter score Spop which keeps track of
how many times each feature has been marked due to a minimum Sprec.
The actual feature selection is based on setting a threshold value t (1 ≤ t ≤ W )
2If two features happen to have the same Sprec value in the current window, only the leftmost
one is marked.
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such that any feature with a popularity score Spop ≥ t is selected as statistically-
improbable. In our case, we use a threshold value t = 2.
Figure 4.3 shows how Spop values are updated while a sliding window of size 9
is moving through a data input sample. The upper row shows the Hnorm values.
After the sliding window reaches the end of the data object, the final Spop values
(step 12) are used to select the statistically-improbable features. For instance, if
the threshold t = 2, three features will be selected (positions 4, 8 and 17) whereas
for t = 4, only two features will be selected (positions 8 and 17).
Once a feature is considered statistically improbable (passed the winnowing
process), it passes through the second filter (criteria 2) which checks if the feature
occurs in the other samples of the same class. Keeping only the features that occur
in all other samples is too restrictive and result in a small number of features. On
the other hand, allowing all features that occur in at least half of the samples is
too permissive and result in a large number of features. Empirical analysis showed
that the best threshold value is to keep only features that appear in at least 75%
of the other samples.
4.2.3 Building fingerprint representations
Having selected a set of features to represent a data object, the next step is to
build a fingerprint representation out of the features. A simple approach consists
in computing the digest (e.g. MD5) of each feature and concatenating the digests
to obtain a fingerprint representation of the data input. This approach is inefficient
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in two aspects. It is space inefficient and it handles membership queries (checking
if an element is part of the set) inefficiently. Note that this simple approach does
not incur any false positive rate for membership queries. A more efficient approach
for set representation is using Bloom filters [72]. The approach trades space and
membership queries efficiency for a small false positive rate in membership queries.
A Bloom filter is an array of bits of a fixed size m initially set to 0. Given a
set of elements {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, inserting an element si in a bloom filter consists
in computing hash values of si according to k different hash functions h1, h2, . . .
hk. Each hash function maps the universe of possible element values to an index
in the bloom filter (i.e. in the range 1 . . .m)3. For each of those hash values,
the Bloom filter entry is set to 1. Checking the membership of an element sj
goes through the same process, that is, computing the k indices using the k hash
values. If all the bits on the k indices are equal to 1, the membership query returns
true. Otherwise, it returns false. As mentioned above, Bloom filter approach for
set representation trades efficiency for a small false positive rate in membership
queries. Indeed, in membership queries, if at least one entry of the computed k
indices is set to 0, we are sure that the element is not in the set. However, if all
the k entries are set to 1, we are not 100% sure that the element is in the set. The
k entries might be set by chance. The good news is that, given the number of
elements already inserted in the Bloom filter, the false positive rate can be easily
estimated [72].
Features are inserted in Bloom filters as follows (Figure 4.4). The sequence
3The hash functions are independent and maps the input to the range 1 . . .m uniformly.
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of packets (packet lengths and direction) is hashed using SHA-1 algorithm which
generates 160 bits. The hash is then split into five 32 bits sub-hashes. Each
sub-hash is considered as different hash value. Hence, k value in this case is
5. The 11 least significant bits of each 32 bits sub-hash is used as index in the
Bloom filter array of bits. The features are inserted in 256-byte Bloom filters
(m = 256 × 8 = 2048 = 211). To keep the false positive rate negligible, the
capacity of a single Bloom filter is fixed to a default value of 128 features. Hence,
the maximum number of marked bits in the Bloom filter is 128×k = 128×5 = 640
bits. When the capacity is reached, a new Bloom filter is created, and so on, until
all the features are represented.
The process of inserting features in Bloom filters is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
The fingerprint representation of a data object is the concatenation of all
Bloom filters preceded by their total number. The obtained representation is
called similarity digest (SD):
SD(dob) = s|bf 1|bf 2|bf 3| . . . bf s (4.4)
where s is the number of Bloom filters and bf i is the ith Bloom filter of data object
dob.
4.2.4 Comparing similarity digests
Computing the similarity between two data objects consists in comparing their
Bloom filters. Hence, the core of the similarity computation process is the com-
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Figure 4.4: Process of inserting a feature into a Bloom filter
parison of two Bloom filters which is based on a modified version of Hamming
distance. Hamming distance measures the minimum number of substitutions re-
quired to change one object into the other.
Let bf1 and bf2 be two Bloom filters and consider the following variables:
• n1 and n2: the number of features in bf1 and bf2 respectively.
• e1 and e2: the number of bits set to one in bf1 and bf2 respectively.
• e12 = bf1 ∩ bf2 : the number of bits set to one in both bf1 and bf2.




−1, if n1 ≤ Nmin







• Nmin is the minimum number of features in a Bloom filter that is needed to
compute a meaningful MHD value.
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• tc is a threshold below which any bit matching is assumed to be due to
chance:
tc = α(Emax − Emin) + Emin (4.6)
• Emax is the maximum number of matching bits due to chance:
Emax = min(n1, n2) (4.7)
• Emin is the minimum number of matching bits due to chance:
Emin = m(1− pke1 − pke2 + pk(e1+e2)) (4.8)
• p is the probability that a specific bit is still 0 after the insertion of all
features.
• α is a calibrating parameter that is set experimentally.
We now have all the ingredients to compute the similarity score (SC) between
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The similarity score as defined in Equation (4.9) is typically used to find a
similarity between a small data object (e.g. file) and a much larger data object
(e.g. hard drive), hence, s << t, that is, the number of Bloom filters is much larger
in dob2 than in dob1. The similarity score computation consists in comparing each
Bloom filter of dob1 with every Bloom filter in dob2 and keep the highest value.
The kept highest values are then averaged to produce the similarity score. Because
the score is the average of the s maximum distances between the bloom filters of
dob1 and all the bloom filters of dob2, a large size of dob2 (i.e. t) does not dilute
the similarity score.
Bloom filters are just arrays of bits. Two data objects having similar data
regions will have similar Bloom filters around those regions. By comparing each
Bloom filter of the first data object with all Bloom filters of the second and
taking the maximum value, the similarity score will reflect the presence of such
overlapping.
4.2.5 Similarity hashing time complexity
Building and comparing final signatures based on the operations over bloom filters.
Initialization operation (Initialize) simply assign 0 to each bloom filter bytes.
Therefore, if the bloom filter size is m then the time complexity of the bloom
filter’s initialization operation is O(m). However, in our implementation, bloom
filter size is 256 bytes; consequently, initialization operation can be done in a
constant time.
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Bloom filter insertion Operation (Insert) insert selected operation into bloom
filter. In theory, inserting an element into a bloom filter requires k-independent
hash functions applied over the selected features. Therefor the time complexity
for this operation would be O(K). However, in our implementation, only one hash
function is applied (SHA1) but the resulted hash digest is split into five parts each
32-bits. Each part is treated as if it is a separated hash function. Consequently,
the time complexity of our implementation could be achieved in a constant time
O(1).
Bloom filters Comparisons operation (Compare) is the heart of the similarity
hashing approach. To do so, both bloom filter should be of the same size as well
as use the same hash function. Bloom filters Comparisons operation basically
compares the two bloom filters via applying the AND bit-wise operation which
has a linear time complexity Θ(m), where m is the size of each bloom filter.
In our implementation, each signature consists of a variable number of bloom
filters. It utilizes the Multi-resolution similarity hashing proposed in [73] which
allow Data objects of variant sizes to be compared against each other. Having
two similarity digest signatures each consists of n bloom filters while every bloom
filter’s size is m, Asymptotically, the time complexity would be O(n2m) since every
bloom filter of the first signature has to be compared against all the bloom filters
of the second data object bloom filters. where n represent the number of bloom
filters in each data object and m is the size of each bloom filter.
According to the author of Multi-resolution similarity hashing [73] going through
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1024 bloom filter comparisons- 256KB AND bit-wise operation- is a trivial task
for the modern machine. However, 256MB bloom filters comparisons would not be
a trivial task. Furthermore, 1TB bloom filters comparisons would be unfeasible.
Unfortunately, manipulating similarity digest approach parameters can alleviate
the amount of calculation as pinpointed in the next section.
4.2.6 Parameters values
The AHBM approach to traffic analysis depends on a set of parameters. The first
parameter is the feature size B which represents the number of packets to include
in a feature. Choosing a small feature size increases the granularity of the data
object representation while loosing specificity. The number of selected features
tends to be larger. Choosing a large feature size increases the specificity of the
selected features while reducing their numbers.
The window size specifies the number of features to consider at each step
before marking the feature with the lowest Sprec score. A large window size means
that a feature will be marked among a large number of considered features. This
yields to fewer features marked with higher popularity scores. A small window
size yields to more features marked but with lower popularity scores.
A small threshold t value results in a large number of selected features which
leads to a bulky representation of input data but reduces the false positives rate.
On the other hand, a large threshold value results in a small number of selected





Typically, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are used to extend a private network
across public networks [74]. Packets are communicated through an encrypted
tunnel (SSL, IPSec, SSH, etc.). Since an observer of a VPN traffic can only see
encrypted packets to and from the VPN server, VPN is also used to hide user
activity and to bypass simple proxy filtering and censorship. Therefore VPN is a
typical target of website fingerprinting attacks [2, 75].
The aim of this first experiment is to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed
AHBM approach on VPN traffic. The used dataset is generated by visiting the
Alexa’s top 100 websites through VPN. The VPN service is provided by an Open-
VPN server on Amazon Web Services (AWS). Each website is fetched 40 times
using Firefox 48.0.1 running on Ubuntu 16.04. A python script is used to auto-
mate the website visits. At each visit, the script clears the browser cache, launches
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a tcpdump process for packet capturing, sets a timer and then fetches the URL.
Each visit is given 20 seconds beyond which the connection is closed and the cap-
tured packets are stored in a pcap file. Websites are fetched in a round-robin
fashion (A first sample of each website is collected, then a second sample, etc.).
The data has been collected during December 2016.
5.1 Selecting parameter values
As mentioned above, the proposed AHBM approach depends on a set of crucial
parameters, in particular, the feature size (how many packets are considered at a
time) and the window size (how many features are considered in the winnowing
based selection). In order to empirically choose the optimal values for those
parameters, we used a modified version of 10-fold cross-validation. At each fold,
36 samples (out of 40) of each website are used to learn the model (selecting the
features). The remaining 4 samples of each website constitute the testing data.
However, unlike typical cross-validation, for each website we compute the AHBM
similarity score between the website model (similarity digest) and all the test data
(all 4 samples of all websites as a single sequence). Then, for every website, we
remove the corresponding 4 samples from the test data and we recalculate the
similarity. This yields, for each website and for each fold, 2 similarity scores: one
score when the website samples are in the test data (typically, a high similarity
score) and one score when the website samples are not part of the test data






































Figure 5.1: Accuracy in terms of feature size and window size.
size) should maximize the difference between the two similarity scores. Figure 5.1
shows the average difference between the two similarity scores, for various feature
size and window size values.
The combination that yields the best results is a feature size of 2 and a window
size of 4. Although a feature size of 2 packets is relatively small, but this cor-
roborates previous results [76, 77] where the optimal traffic analysis results were
obtained by considering consecutive pairs of packet size values.
5.1.1 Cross-validation results
Most of existing website fingerprinting techniques are evaluated through typical
cross-validation. Cross-validation is a statistical method for accuracy estimation.
It works by dividing data into two segments: one used to train the model (or
models) and the other used to validate the model. In typical cross-validation,
the training and validation sets must cross-over in successive rounds such that
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each data point has a chance of being validated against. The basic form is k-fold
cross-validation where the data is first partitioned into k equally sized segments or
folds. Subsequently, k iterations (or folds) of training and validation are performed
using a different segment each time. Our experiment consists in applying a 10-fold
cross-validation on the collected data. That is, in each fold 36 samples are used
for selecting the features and the remaining 4 samples are used for testing. This
process is repeated 10 times (folds) choosing in each fold 4 different samples for
testing.
The measures we used for the precision are: precision, recall and F -measure. In
our context, precision measures the fraction of website samples identified correctly.





where tp and fp represent respectively the number of true positives and the number
of false positives. Recall, on the other hand, measures the fraction of the total set





where fn represents the number of false negatives.
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Figure 5.2: Precision, Recall, and F1 measure values for cross-validation on VPN
dataset.
Finally, F1 combines both precision and recall as follows:
F1 = 2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
(5.3)
The 1 in F1 comes from the fact that recall and precision are evenly weighted.
There is a more general form of the F -measure where precision and recall have
different weights.
Figure 5.2 shows the results of cross-validation on the VPN dataset which are
87% for the precision, 76% for the recall, and 81% for the F1 measure. Previous
work on VPN traffic reported slightly better results: Herrman et al. [2] reported a
94% accuracy while Fegghi et al. [75] reported between 90 and 95% accuracy. The
proposed approach is, however, significantly more scalable than previous work.
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Figure 5.3: 10-fold cross-validation using different number of training samples.
5.2 Effect of the number of training samples
Figure 5.3 shows how the different accuracy measures (precision, recall, and F1)
behave as the number of samples used to generate the similarity digest changes.
The experiment consists in repeating 10-fold cross-validation starting from only
one training samples up to 28 training samples. As expected, more training sam-
ples produces better accuracy measures. Interestingly, the accuracy stays ac-
ceptable (85% precision with 63% recall) even when only one sample is used to
generate the similarity digest. In that extreme case, it is important to mention
that all features considered statistically improbable are selected and added to the
bloom filters because the second criteria (Section 4.2.2) can’t be used with only
one sample.
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5.3 Identifying a website within a sequence of
web activity
In all existing website fingerprinting techniques [18, 3, 57, 2] learning a website
”fingerprint” requires to visit the website several times and to record the set of
packet sequences (samples) resulting from those visits. The set of samples have
typically comparable sizes (number of packets). This allows to extract features
such as the number of incoming packets, the number of outgoing packets, the
number of received bytes, etc. which allow to build a model/signature for that
website. Consequently, for a website model to be efficient in identifying website
occurrence in unknown traffic, it should be matched, each time, with an extracted
sequence of packets having a size similar to the samples used in the training
phase. Captured traffic, however, comes in the form of a long sequence of packets
corresponding to all sort of user activity without clear separation. This issue
was not considered in most of previous work on website fingerprinting because
k-fold cross-validation is typically used for the experimental evaluation. k-fold
cross-validation calculates the accuracy in terms of already ”split” samples.
To identify a website occurrence within a long sequence of captured packets,
there are currently two main approaches: splitting the traffic and using a sliding
window. Tao and Goldberg [71] discussed the splitting problem and proposed two
ways of implementing it: time-based splitting and classification-based splitting.
Time-based splitting is efficient provided that the time-gap between two website
visits is large. If the time-gap is small, classification-based splitting is used which
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has an additional processing overhead. Either ways, the website fingerprinting
attack needs to go through an initial splitting pre-processing step.
Feghhi and Leith [75] adopt a sliding window approach with a 10 packets
moving step. At each step, a sequence of n packets is extracted from the traffic
and matched with the website model where n is the size of samples used in the
training phase. Even with a moving step of 10 packets, this approach is clearly
not scalable for realistic scenarios.
The proposed AHBM approach is particularly efficient to identify website oc-
currences in a network traffic capture of arbitrary size. This is achieved by com-
paring bloom filters composing the similarity digest of the website with bloom
filters corresponding to different regions of the network traffic capture. By taking
the average of the maximum distances between each bloom filter of the website
and all bloom filters of the unknown traffic, the final similarity score is not diluted
by the size of the unknown traffic capture. Figure 5.4 shows the similarity score
computation process in terms of bloom filters.
We carried out a modified version k-fold cross-validation where all samples of
the test data are consolidated to form a single long sequence of packets. For each
website, the similarity score with test data is computed two times: one time when
the website packets are part of the test data and one time when the website packets
are excluded from the test data. For each case and for each website, Figure 5.5
shows the range of all values observed in the 10-folds (dashed lines) and where
75% of the values are concentrated (closed boxes). The following interesting facts
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Figure 5.4: The similarity score computation between the website’s SD and the
unknown traffic’s SD.
can be observed from the figure:
1. The average similarity scores, when the website is part of the test data and
when it is excluded, are clearly far apart with the former larger than the
latter for all 100 websites.
2. The standard deviation of the similarity scores when the website is not part
of the test data is interestingly small. This justifies the selection of the
threshold tsc on the basis of this case (the similarity score with arbitrary
traffic capture not including the website).
3. The standard deviation of the similarity scores when the website is part of
the test data is relatively large. One explanation is that from one fold to
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of the similarity scores for each website (1) when the
website is part of the testing data and (2) when the website is removed from the
testing data.
another, not all distinguishing features are selected for the website model.
Recall that features are selected provided they are part of at least 75% of
the training samples.
Figure 5.6 shows the precision, recall and F1 measures for the same experiment.
Compared to Figure 5.2, values are 10% lower but are still acceptable.
5.4 Effect of the size of the test data
In the modified k-fold cross-validation experiment of the previous section, all
samples of the test data are consolidated into a single long sequence of packets.
The website similarity digest is then matched with that long sequence. Having 100
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Figure 5.6: Precision, recall, and F1 measures for a modified 10-fold cross-
validation (All test samples are consolidated in a single sequence.
websites, the size of the test data in each fold is approximately 1GB. To see the
effect of the size of the test data on the accuracy measures, we repeated the k-fold
cross-validation (Figure 5.6) while increasing the size of the test data. To this end,
we collected additional web browsing data by visiting the next top 900 websites
according to alexa (top 100 - 1000 websites) using the same setup (OpenVPN
on AWS Cloud Service). The test data is then augmented incrementally using
chunks of 200MB from the additional collected data. Figure ?? shows the accuracy
measures as the test data goes from 1GB to 3GB. As the test data increases, the
measure values do not change significantly. The recall (TPR) keeps the same
value (7̃7%). The precision, however, decreases slowly. The explanation is that

















































OVER TOR AND ENCRYPTED
WIRELESS
6.1 Website fingerprinting on Tor traffic
Tor traffic is a common target for website fingerprinting attacks as Tor is an
overlay network that aims to provide privacy and anonymity to its users. Previous
work reported high accuracy website fingerprinting attacks on Tor [18, 3, 78, 79].
However, several concerns have been raised regarding the practicality of these
attacks in realistic scenarios [80, 1, 71].
We used three datasets to assess the accuracy of the proposed AHBM approach
on Tor traffic:
• Cai dataset [18]: 100 websites, 40 samples each.
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• Tao dataset [3]: 100 websites, 40 samples each.
• Our dataset: 100 websites, 40 samples each.
Our dataset have been collected by visiting the top 100 Alexa websites, 40
times each, using Tor Browser. The websites are fetched in round-robin fashion
and is automated using the Tor-selenium plugin. Every visit lasts for a maximum
of 30 seconds and there is a 5 seconds time gap between each successive visits.
Packets are stored in pcap files which are then parsed to keep only the direction,
order, and size of packets (Figure 4.1). The data is collected during January 2017.
6.1.1 One-to-one cross-validation results
Table 6.1 shows the result of 10-fold cross-validation on the three datasets. The
values are clearly lower than previous work (Cai et al. [18] and Tao and Gold-
berg [3]). As in the case of VPN dataset, for our AHBM approach, the best
results were obtained with a feature size of 2 and window size of 4. The only
exception is Cai et al. dataset where the best results were obtained with a feature
size of 6 and a window size of 4. The explanation is that in Cai et al. dataset,
packet sizes are rounded to multiple of 600 and consequently the number of dif-
ferent packet sizes becomes very limited (600, 1200, 1800, etc.) which requires a
longer feature size to allow ”distinguishability”.
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Recall (TPR) Recall (TPR) Recall (TPR)
(AHBM) (Cai et al.) (Tao et al.)
Our dataset 58% – –
Cai dataset (rounded) 64% 86% 91%
Tao dataset 53% 88% 99%
Table 6.1: Recall (TPR) for our AHBM, Cai et al., and Tao et al. approaches on
three datasets.
6.1.2 Identifying a website within a sequence of web ac-
tivity through Tor
In order to assess the efficiency of the proposed AHBM approach to identify a
website visit within a long sequence of network traffic packets (without splitting
and using a sliding window), we used one-to-all cross-validation on the three
datasets. For each website, Figure 6.1 shows the range of all values observed in
the 10-folds (dashed lines) and where 75% of the values are concentrated (closed
boxes).
For the majority of websites, the similarity score between the website similarity
digest and the consolidated test data is smaller when the website is not part of
the test data. However, there is a clear overlap between the two cases (website is
included and website is excluded). This explains the low recall (TPR) values for
the same 3 datasets: 44% on our data, 41% on Cai data, and 31% on Tao data.
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(b) Cai et al. dataset























(c) Tao et al. dataset
Figure 6.1: Distribution of the similarity scores for each website when the website
is part of the testing data (green) and when the website is removed from the
testing data (red) for (a) our dataset , (b) Cai et al. dataset, and (c) Tao et al.
dataset.
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6.1.3 Effect of website’s instances number in both accu-
racy and time calculation
To test the scalability of the state of the art contribution into website finger-
printing field on tor, We have run each implemented work with their companion
dataset. every time Weconfigure each implementation with different training in-
stances number. starting with 4 instances for each website then , 8, 12,...,40. Ac-
curacy for each run as well as the the time in hours each implementation needed
to train its final model/s. The values are summarized in table 6.2. Table shows
clearly that Toe and Cai work has the superiority in this field respectively. How-
ever, to reach their high accuracy tens of hours are need to train their classifier.
Our implemented approach are very quick and scalable, but it has a decent ac-
curacy against Tor. The good news it that our approach has a very promising
in other fields on network analysis while these Superior contribution at tor are
not practical at the other fields due to their intensive calculation. Furthermore, a
pre-processing operation has to be achieved before their classifier get trained such
as packets’ length rounding as with Cai et al.[18] or working with cells instead of
working with packets or splitting process as with Toe et al. [3] work.
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Cai et al. Toe et al. Our Approach
W.No Inst.No Acc Time Acc Time Acc Time1 Time2
100 4 0 0.17 0 1.16 9 0.045 1.51
100 8 0 0.72 0 4.61 23 0.051 1.54
100 12 79.7 1.62 85.1 10.42 32 0.048 1.56
100 16 81.7 2.82 85.3 17.70 38 0.047 1.58
100 20 83.5 4.31 86.45 27.68 41 0.050 1.56
100 24 84.3 6.12 86.5 39.67 42 0.049 1.51
100 28 85.6 8.18 87.55 54.35 45 0.050 1.58
100 32 87 10.78 88.00 71.41 46 0.049 1.54
100 36 87.7 13.61 88.83 89.06 49 0.048 1.53
100 40 88.1 16.93 – – 50 0.049 1.50
Table 6.2: Recall (TPR) for our AHBM, Cai et al., and Tao et al. approaches on
three datasets.
6.2 Website fingerprinting over encrypted wire-
less connection
The aim of this experiment is to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed AHBM
approach on Encrypted Wireless network traffics. Our evaluation of encrypted
wireless connection based on side-channel information leaks where the attacker
has no access to the targeted encrypted WLAN. The attacker’s goal is to infer
user’s internet browsing activities. According to the literature, a similar attack
could be achieved on cellular networks with relative ease [81].
To achieve such attack successfully, an attacker should have a foreknowledge
about the targeted device MAC address. If not, MAC address still can be obtained
via utilizing the organizationally unique identifier (OUI) lists to identify the tar-
geted user device MAC address. Moreover, the targeted device MAC address can
be also obtained through utilizing wireless Localization techniques [82].
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6.2.1 Data collection
Dataset has been collected in an automated controlled environments that con-
sist of three devices: Victim PC with a wireless adapter, Wireless Access Point
and attacker PC powered by Kali Linux and a wireless adapter in monitor mode.
Victim PC with wireless adapter equipped with a python script that utilizes se-
lenium library to control the chrome Browser. It visited 30 websites of Alexa’s
top websites each 40 times in a round-robin fashion (the first sample of each web-
site is collected, then a second sample, etc.). During website fetching process
from Victim PC over the encrypted wireless connection, attacker PC monitors all
the wireless traffic between victim PC and the Access Point over their dedicated
channel. To ensure that our labeling process is accurate for classification pro-
cess, victim PC and attacker PC were synchronized over socket communication.
airodump-ng tool is used for capturing process while Wireshark was used for the
filtering process. During both processes, filtering was achieved over MAC address.
The data has been collected during April 2017.
6.2.2 One-to-one cross-validation results
As in the case of VPN dataset, we have evaluated our approach against the wireless
dataset. Only features that are shared among the 75% of the training instances
will be incorporated in creating the final model for each website. The good result
is obtained with a feature size of 2 and window size of 2 instead of 4 as with
VPN experiment because it gets better accuracy. With Windows size of 4 recall,
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Figure 6.2: Precision, Recall, and F1 measure values for cross-validation on wire-
less dataset.
precession and F-measure were 0.75, 0.71 and 0.73 respectively while with window
size 2 recall, precession and F-measure were 0.84, 0.89 and 0.86 as shown in
figure 6.2. It is logical that window size 2 produce better results than window size
4. As mentioned in chapter 3 that smaller window size resulted with more number
of features are incorporated in generating the final bloom filters. Consequently,
false positive will be decreased while true positive are increased. The price paid is
slightly increases in feature processing. However, the increase in processing could
be negligible. The change will in the following, instead of chosen the least likely
features among 4 features; it will be selected between two features.
6.2.3 Identifying a website within a sequence of web ac-
tivity encrypted wireless connection
Again, in order to assess the efficiency of the proposed AHBM approach to identify
a website visit within a long sequence of network traffic packets (without split-
70




















Figure 6.3: Distribution of the similarity scores for each website (1) when the
website is part of the testing data and (2) when the website is removed from the
testing data.
ting and using a sliding window), we used one-to-all cross-validation on wireless
dataset. For each website, Figure 6.1 shows the range of all values observed in
the 10-folds (dashed lines) and where 75% of the values are concentrated (closed
boxes).
For the majority of websites, the similarity score between the website similarity
digest and the consolidated test data is smaller when the website is not part of
the test data. However, there is a clear separation between the two cases (website
is included and website is excluded). This explains the high values resulted from
the one-to-one cross validation demonstrated earlier.
Figure 6.4 shows the precision, recall and F1 measures for the same experiment.
Compared to Figure 6.2, values are slightly lower but are still acceptable.
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Figure 6.4: Precision, recall, and F1 measures for a modified 10-fold cross-
validation (All test samples are consolidated in a single sequence.
6.3 Observations
Based on results acquired from website fingerprinting over encrypted wireless con-
nection, configured with WAP2, and secure VPN client software installed on user
computer device, We can see that there are similarities between VPN and wireless
experiments. This similar behavior resulted form the fact that both secure VPN
and wireless access point configured with encrypted protocol do nothing except
that they encapsulate the exchanged data in a secure tunnel even though the both
techniques are functions at different network layers. While website fingerprinting
over tor browser has shown different and poor accuracy result with our approach
is because of the following: firstly, tor browser is utilizing the tor network which
uses anonymity protocol-Onion routing- in addition to applying three layer of en-
cryption. Furthermore, tor browser has built in randomization technique that its
purpose is to exchanged data in a randomized manner in order to hide brows-
ing fingerprinting activities. Moreover, tor browser exchange data using cell unit.
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Each unit is of size 512 bytes. Even though if the exchanged data is less than
512; the exchanged data will be padded with random data. Cells and padding are
intentionally incorporated in order to wipe out fingerprinting resulted from the
generated packets size. Therefore, the only things remaining for the attacker to





Detecting malware activity through traffic analysis is attractive since it allows to
cover a large number of hosts without requiring any of these hosts to install any
software. Deep packet inspection (DPI) is the major approach for network mal-
ware detection which consists in checking the packet payloads in search of specific
bytes. As mentioned above, DPI assumes that malware communicates through
plain-text protocols (e.g. http, IRC, etc.). As malware are increasingly using en-
crypted protocols as well as secure tunneling, recent network malware detection
approaches resorted to pattern-based traffic analysis [40, 47, 83]. Furthermore,
incorporating obfuscation techniques as well as rootkit services borrowed from
other malware make malware detection by anti-malware very challenging prob-
lem. According to the literature, classical anti-malware have shown a failure to
keep an up-to-date database of malware signatures to defend against rapid mal-
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ware generations. This escalation from the malware authors triggers researchers
to develop behavioral countermeasure since it becomes impractical to generate a
signature for each malware.
Malware network signatures are defined in terms of features such as number of
packets, number of bytes, average bytes per packet, etc. which requires, again, to
split the traffic into packet sequences corresponding to potential malware sessions.
This section details the empirical analysis of applying AHBM approach on
a malware dataset. We will demonstrate how our similarity hashing approach
can be incorporated in building behavioral network-based clustering system. To
reach our goal, we have utilized our customized approximate hash based matching
as a similarity metric. Consequently, our proposed system clusters unlabeled
malware into groups based on the similarity of the groups’ members. The goal of
clustering malware is not to discriminate between malware families. However, it
is for creating behavioral model for each group. Therefore, learned models should
have the ability to identify their representative similarities and variants.
We have two scenarios to achieve this. The first option could be achieved via,
starting by assuming each malware sample acts as a cluster. Then, a hierarchical
clustering algorithm is applied. The second option, which we have applied is
through applying K-mean clustering algorithm. One of the main issue with K-
mean algorithm is deciding the number of the clusters that the algorithm should
start with. To solve this issue, we resort to using AVCLASS tool [84] that
utilize virus total to label binary malware samples. even though, according to
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the literature, anti-malware labeling is not accurate since there is no labeling
standard that majority of anti-malware agree on. Even though our used tool for
labeling tries to use the majority name resulted from virus-total. However, our
clustering uses this labels just to decide the number of initial clustering as an input
to k-mean clustering algorithm. One more benefit of using major anti-malware
labeling before indulging in clustering procedure is that, we can see during the
clustering operation how the family members grouped together. For example, w
have seen the two biggest families- trymedia and installcore respectively- spilted
into several clusters. On the other hand, two different malware families-imaili and
zenzue- are grouped together into one cluster with all their instances. Each group
is represented by a centroid. The Centroid is a malware sample instance that has
the highest similarity connection relationship among all the other members of its
related group.
7.1 Data collection
The list of malware binaries used in the data collection is retrieved from virusshare1
malware repository. The list consists of 16000 malware binaries posted on the
repository on September 2016. To execute the binaries and capture their traf-
fic, we used a sandbox-based isolation program, namely, sandboxie2 running on a
Windows XP SP3 32-bits virtual machine. As an initial filtering step, Wewrote




non-windows, non-32 bit, and corrupted header binaries. Then, each valid binary
is executed once through the sandbox while capturing its network communica-
tion. Each execution lasts 2 minutes. As expected, a significant portion of valid
malware did not yield network activity. The list of possible reasons include:
• malware using anti-VM
• malware using anti-sandbox
• malware using anti-debugging
• Command and Control (C2) server is down.
Malware that exchanged less than 50 packets is filtered out. Among the 16000
initial malware binary retrieved from virusshare, only 1050 passed the two filtering
steps. Among this 1050 binary, we chose the first 1000 for the data collection.
Malware data collection consists of executing the filtered 1000 binaries, 10 times
each, in a round-robin fashion through the sandbox on the same Windows XP
SP3 virtual machine. Each execution lasts 2 minutes. From the 1000 malware,
we kept only the malware that yields 10 valid samples. That is, if a malware has
at least one sample (out of 10) with less than 50 packets, it is dropped. After this
last filtering, we ended up with 587 malware, with 10 valid samples each.
Malware execution has been done automatically via utilizing the sandboxie
command line for either running the malicious program as well as halting it. Each
malware allowed two minutes to be executed. During malware execution, tshark-
Wireshark command line- used to sniff the network generated by the executed
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malware and filter out all unrelated network traffic such as DNS, NBNS. Fur-
thermore, background services are implicitly stopped, that automatically initiate
internet connection between now such as windows update, google service update,
multimedia sharing, Firefox browser update and error reporting, are stopped.
Moreover, before running the data collection process, we have made our virtu-
alized environment powered on for about one hour while making sure nothing is
running on except Wireshark sniffer on it to inspect if there were some unobserved
program or service that still use the Internet connection without our knowledge.
After dataset collection process finished, all malware samples that generate less
than 50 packets has been deleted for each related instance. Consequently, only
587 samples remained in our dataset. Then, we use AVCLASS tool [84] that uti-
lize virus total to label binary malware samples according to their family name.
Malware that can not be recognized by the labeling tool unrecognized label is
assigned to them. At the end, we got 27 families. The biggest family consist of
92 samples whereas the small family has two.
7.2 Clustering procedure
Applying cross-validation on the malware dataset the same way as VPN and Tor
datasets produced very low accuracy results. The main problem is that considering
each binary as a separate class is not appropriate for malware traffic analysis
because several binaries correspond to the same malware due to obfuscation3.
3Malware obfuscation consists of a set of technique to change the shape of binaries in order to
bypass antivirus detection. This includes encryption, packing, polymorphism, metamorphism,
78
To overcome this issue, malware binaries are clustered into families sharing the
same features. Malware clustering is a commonly used technique to deal with the
redundancy of malware binaries [50, 10].
Typical malware clustering approaches rely either on malware executable bytes [85,
86] malware system call traces [87, 88], or non-encrypted network activity [50, 10,
8]. The malware clustering we propose in this section relies only on packets size,
order, and direction of the malware network traffic. This makes the clustering
applicable for any malware having network activity.
Our data set consist of 587 samples. Each sample has 10 instances. To test our
proposed approach on behavior malware clustering based on network traffic, we
have applied five fold cross-validation. In each fold step, we take eight instances
from each malware sample in our dataset to participate in the clustering process.
The remaining two instances from each malware sample are kept to be used lately
as a testing dataset against the generated final signature of each final cluster.
Clustering Procedure goes through the following steps: firstly, fold one train-
ing data are grouped based on labels using AVCLASS tool, which assign a label
for each malware via utilizing virus-total reports as mentioned earlier. How-
ever, this labeling is not mandatory as Wewill explain later. Then, a distance is
calculated between each pair in every group using our customized approximate
hashing (AHBM). Consequently, a malware instance that has the highest similar-
ity connections relationship among the group members and satisfies the similarity
threshold will be nominated as the centroid of that group. If it happens that
etc.
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more than three instances within a group have not matched with threshold simi-
larity(out layers); They will be moved to their new cluster and the same centroid
calculation will be applied to them in a recursive way. After this step, each cluster
will have its own centroid. Then, all centroid will be compared against each other.
If two centroids happen to mach the similarity threshold; the cluster with small
members will be merged with with largest cluster. The remaining clusters that
their centroid have no similarity, each instance of that cluster will be compared
with every other clusters’ centroids. If it happens that a higher similarity value
has been achieved with other centroids other than its current one, then this in-
stance will move to that centroid cluster. After every instance has got its chance
to see the best cluster to stay in, centroid calculation algorithm will calculate
again to fit the new movement and merging process. Centroid calculation, merg-
ing and movement process will be repeated several time until no need for further
merging or movement steps any more. Then, all centroids similarity hashes digest
using AHBM will be selected as the final behavior model for each group. To see
the effect of the selected centroid models, each centroid will be tested against its
related test data samples and tested also against two normal data sets that have
been used as a benchmark for the intrusion detection systems [89]. After that
fold two, fold three. Fold four and fold five go through the same steps that fold
one went through but with their training and test data. The whole clustering
procedure can summarize in the following pseudo code.
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Algorithm 1 Malware clustering using AHBM similarity score
INPUT: S = {the set of all malware traffic samples mts}
INPUT: thclst: a similarity score threshold
OUTPUT: C: a set of malware clusters









for each pair of clusters Ci and Cj in Ctemp do
if SC(ctroidi, ctroidj) ≥ thclst then
Merge Ci and Cj into a new cluster




for each cluster Ck still in Ctemp do
for each instance mts in Ck do
Find the closest cluster to mts
closestC ← arg max
i...|C|
SC(mts, ctroidi)
Migrate mts to closestC
end for
end for
until no more splitting and no more merging
function centroid calculation(Ck)
//Select a centroid (ctroidk) for Ck







//Look for outliers in cluster Ck
outliersK ← {mtski |SC(mtski , ctroidk) < thclst}
//Create a new cluster and split recursively
if |outliersk| > 3 then


































Figure 7.1: Accuracy in terms of feature size and window size.
7.3 Chosen parameters
several parameters participated in our proposed system. First of all anti-malware
labeling, as We have mentioned earlier that it is not mandatory to resort to it
because we can start with arbitrary as if we start to used hierarchical clustering
algorithm. We argue with this because of the following: first of all the purpose
of the proposed system is to create a behavioral network clustering models for
unlabeled malware group that has similar network behavior to be used as their
signature. Secondly, merging and movement operation have the capability to
end up with almost similar group resulted from k-mean. Furthermore, most of
the labeling approaches are taken from either strings within binary code, system
behavior; its rarely a name has been generated network behaviour. Last but not
the least, several malware today are composed of more than one malware type or
different malware types are using the same network payloads delivery mechanisms
or two malware variant use different network payload delivery; that is why we
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notice that two or more different families have similar network behavior. What
is matter practitioner’s more is the false positive. They suffer from false positive
especially with using intrusion detection systems.
Score similarity threshold is the second parameter participated in malware
clustering procedure. Score similarity threshold means the minimum similarity
score needed so that we can tell that the two compared instances are similar.
In our evaluation we have used similarity score (t=20) based on experimental
experiments. We have tested it with three different values t=[15,20,30]. Larger
the similarity score threshold value used will result in a large number of generated
clusters. Consequently, more centroids will be generated with high False negative.
This typically happens with large malware families that include a big number of
instances. Consequently, it will be hard to represent all the malware with on or
two centroids. For example, in our experiment, installCore and trymedia families,
which are the largest malware families in our dataset, have been represented with
around six clusters each.
As with VPN experiment mentioned in chapter 3, feature size (how many
packets are considered at a time) and the window size (how many features are
considered in the winnowing based selection). In order to empirically choose the
optimal values for those parameters, Clustering Procedure has been applied several
times using a different combination for both features size and widow size. Good
parameter values (feature size and window size) should maximize the F1-measure
calculated for each five-fold cross validation clustering experiment. Figure 7.1
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shows F1-measure resulted form the different combinations of feature size and
window size. Clearly, it can be seen that the best result acquired resulted form
using feature size equals to 2 and window size equals to 4. This combination is
similar to the best values chosen at VPN experiment demonstrated at chapter 3.
7.4 Evaluation
As long as the purpose of our contribution is to test the applicability of our
customized approximate hashing as a similarity metric to cluster the unlabeled
malware into groups. So that we can generate a behavioral signature for each
group as it has been demonstrated clearly in the previous section. Therefore,
we will evaluate our clustering procedure using two measures: Conciseness and
Compactness. The purpose of using these two accuracy measures is to test how
good our proposed similarity metric at clustering malware into groups as well as
how are members of each generated cluster are close to each other respectively.
7.4.1 Compactness
Compactness Basically measures the relationship connectivity among resulted
clusters’ members. A good generated cluster its members are very close to each
other. In our context, a good cluster exists when all cluster’s members have high
similarity among each other. To check similarity connectivity among cluster’s
members in our case we applied the following formula: the number of relations
exists that satisfy the assigned similarity score threshed over the maximum num-
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Figure 7.2: Clusters Compactness.
ber of the all possible relations supposed to be existed. Where the maximum
number of the all possible relations calculated via following formula:
compactness = A/(n ∗ (n− 1)/2) (7.1)
where n is the number of instances in cluster, A represents the number of relations
exists that satisfy the assigned similarity score threshed.
To evaluate how good our generated clusters using our proposed approach,
compactness has been calculated for each final resulted cluster using the previous
formula. Figure 7.2 shows the compactness values calculated for every cluster
that have been generated during the five cross-fold validation with confidence
interval equals 0.99. From the figure, we see that almost all the clusters members
have high similarity value matching the similarity score threshold assigned at the
start of clustering procedure (t=20). Furthermore, from quartile figure, we can
see that for each cluster around half its members have full similarity relationship
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Figure 7.3: Precision, Recall, and F1 measure values for cross- validation on
Malware dataset.
connection with all their siblings.
7.4.2 Conciseness
Conciseness demonstrates the capability of our proposed similarity metric as a
function to cluster malware into groups that share similar network behavior. Fur-
thermore, it will test how good our final generated centroids’ approximate hash
bloom filters are a good representative to there related group members. To fulfill
this objective, we will test our final generated centroid’s approximate hash bloom
filters resulted from each fold mentioned in the cluster procedure mentioned earlier
against their related test dataset. For each fold, we calculate the Recall, Preces-
sion and F1-measure. Through these values, we can see how good our clustering
process as depicted in figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3 shows the results of malware behavioral clustering procedure which
are 96% for the precision, 71% for the recall, and 82% for the F1-measure. As we
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can see that Precession is very high compared to the Recall which means that,
whenever we faced a similar malware test instance point, we have a high confidence
that our centroids approximate hash based filters will be able to catch it. However,
regarding the recall’s low degrade compare to the precession is because of that, a
test malware instance might be get caught by another centroid’s signature other
than its related one or might be tested against a different centroids other than
its related centroid. This situations might happen when some malware instances
spreed into different clusters. Therefore, its related test instances will be tested
against two different centroids because our implementation allows each centroids
to have a list of all its member’s test data instances to be tested later against them.
Another reason behind is that, a malware instances spread into different groups
during clustering procedure is that, as we mentioned in the dataset collection
earlier that, each malware samples has been executed ten times at different time
intervals. Therefore, a malware might decide to change his networking behaviour
at different time it has been executed in order to avoid classical anti-malware or
firewall rules.
7.4.3 Cluster centroids against single large dataset
In these evaluation, we check the capability of our approach to check the existence
of a needle in a haystack instead of comparing an apple with an apple as it usually
happened with other proposed solutions in this field. We accomplish these via
checking the existence of a cluster’s centroid or any malware instance belonging
87



















Figure 7.4: Centroids Signature VS three single big test datasets.
to its group within one thousand of malware traffic gathered into one single test
file. Basically, the test dataset used has been taken from cross fold test data used
during the clustering process. The difference between this experiment and the
ordinary cross-fold validation experiment preformed earlier is that, during cross-
fold validation each cluster’s centroid checked against each test malware instance
in one-to-one comparison fashion while this experiment is similar to finding a
needle in a haystack as mentioned earlier. Every cluster’s centroid is tested against
the all its fold malware instances that are combined into a single file. Therefore,
we do not know where the centroids test data instances exists. It may be at
the beginning, at the middle or scattered through the combined single test data
file. During the same time, each cluster’s centroid is also tested against two
normal traffic datasets borrowed from the intrusion detection system test data
benchmark[89]. The first dataset size is 16GB while the second dataset size is
4GB. The result of this experiment is demonstrated in fig 7.4. We can see from
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the figure that similarity values of malware centroids against the malicious test
data vary between 85 and 100 similarity score. Furthermore, as the quartiles show
that, more than half of the similarity values hit 100 similarity with confidence
interval equals 0.99. While centroids similarity values against the two normal
dataset vary between 0 and 33 similarity score. In the same way, half of similarity
scores between the malware clusters’ centroids and the two normal traffic dataset
is zero with confidence interval equals 0.99. These values give us a high confidence
that our proposed approximate hashing used as a similarity metric as well as the
way to represent the final clusters’ centroid by hash bloomed filter is an effective
method for clustering malware in groups in order to create a behavioral network




8.1 Summary of contribution
Networking traffic can be easily captured. Captured Traffic can be either analyzed
at run-time or stored for later inspection. Privacy enhancing technologies, that
applies extensive encryption, aim at protecting clients from malicious software,
that has been implemented intentionally to intrude internet users’ privacy. Several
works, that utilize different machine learning algorithms, have shown that VPN
product is vulnerable to website fingerprint attack. Highest contribution achieved
94%. However, their proposed solution are calculation intensive. Tens of hours are
needed to train a classifier on only 100 websites. Furthermore, currently available
contributions can not handle needle in a haystack scenario without extensive pre-
processing. Therefore, scalability is a major issue for current works.
The main Contribution of this thesis is to tackle the scalability faced earlier
proposed solutions. It is inspired by similarity digest hashing(ABHM), that it has
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been incorporated recently in digital forensics. We have customized the core of
the similarity digest approach to be tailored with network traffic analysis. My
proposed approach has shown superiority over the current website fingerprint at-
tacks. It generates the final modules in minutes instead of hours with scalability
merit as well. It achieved 87% precision rate over VPN and 0.89 over an en-
crypted wireless connection. This accuracy have been achieved while taking a
fixed threshold values. Selected thresholds are learned for each website while test-
ing each website’s generated model against a large test data when that website
is not included within that test data. Consequently, our final models consist of
both sdhash bloom filters, that generated by our customized tool, and the learned
threshold.
In addition, we have also shown that my proposed approach has a very promis-
ing application in designing behavioral malware traffic detection system. Cus-
tomized similarity digest has been tailored to be used as a distance metric. My
implemented approach was able to cluster 587 malware into (17-19) clusters- re-
sulted from five different runs. At the end, the centroids generated for each group
are selected as a final malware signatures. Last but not the least, we have also
shown that our generated malware clusters’ centroid signatures were able to dif-
ferentiate between normal and malicious traffic with a very small false positive
rate. We can control false positive until approaches zero via adjusting selected
thresholds, that are companion to our generated models as we have demonstrated
in the previous chapter. Empirical experiments showed that there are a clear sep-
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aration when clusters’ centroids signature are tested against both normal traffic
and malware traffic testing data.
To summarize, experimental results show a very promising results for VPN,
malware traffic, encrypted wireless traffic, but low results for Tor traffic.
8.2 Threat to validity
Regarding incorporating the tailored similarity hashing approach into network
traffic analysis, if a new formula used for calculating the similarity score instead
of the one mentioned in section 4.2.4; a major difference in reported results may
appear especially for website fingerprinting over tor browser with which we have
got a poor result compared to the other experiments.
On the other hand, to detect malware’s network traffic, our proposed solution
has weakness which commonly shared with dynamic analysis solutions. First of
all, our collected dataset is collected from the execution of malware under sandbox
environment. Therefore malware that employs anti-sand-boxing techniques will
evade disclosing their networking behavior. Consequently, they will not contribute
in clustering procedure. To remedy this limitation, instances that did not generate
network sample should be given another chance to be executed in real physical
environment. The second limitation is due to the time interval allowed for each
malware to be executed. In our experiment, each malware instance allowed only
two minutes. Therefore, some malware might not expose a distinctive behavior
during this time period limit waiting for a certain activity or related issues as
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mentioned in [90]. In the same way, similar limitation resulted form malware
samples that relies on user input to perform their actions as demonstrated in
[91]. Another limitation is related to the environments that we used for executing
malware samples, which is over windows XP SP3. According to Moser et al.
[92] running malware in multiple environment in parallel with other computer
programs such as anti-malware or with different network infrastructure might
yield different behavior.
Last but not the least, any traffic manipulation such as Morphing-Packet size,
HTTPOS, Traffic padding etc. might reduce the accuracy our approach. For
example, Tor browser applies packets padding. As a result, we have got a poor
result compared to the other experiments.
8.3 Future work
A possible area of work is to keep optimizing the parameters of the proposed
approach to gain more accuracy while keeping the same scalability levels.
Another application of our approach could be classifying different internet
application(p2p, video streaming, etc.) that exchange packet over the internet
network.
One more potential application of our approach is about secured wireless net-
work. We intend to further classify smart phones application (Facebook, twitter,
email-client, ..etc.) either over Android and IPhone. According the literature,
classifying Facebook application is easier than fingerprinting its related website
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visit through internet browsers.
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[17] W. de Donato, A. Pescapé, and A. Dainotti, “Traffic identification engine:
an open platform for traffic classification,” Network, IEEE, vol. 28, no. 2, pp.
56–64, 2014.
97
[18] X. Cai, X. C. Zhang, B. Joshi, and R. Johnson, “Touching from a distance:
Website fingerprinting attacks and defenses,” in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
conference on Computer and communications security. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2012, pp. 605–616.
[19] V. Roussev, “Data fingerprinting with similarity digests,” in Advances in
digital forensics vi. Springer, 2010, pp. 207–226.
[20] ——, “Building a better similarity trap with statistically improbable fea-
tures,” in System Sciences, 2009. HICSS’09. 42nd Hawaii International Con-
ference on. IEEE, 2009, pp. 1–10.
[21] T. Karagiannis, A. Broido, N. Brownlee, K. Claffy, and M. Faloutsos, “Is
p2p dying or just hiding?[p2p traffic measurement],” in Global Telecommuni-
cations Conference, 2004. GLOBECOM’04. IEEE, vol. 3. IEEE, 2004, pp.
1532–1538.
[22] A. M. M. K. K. O. M. S. L. E. A. M. W. E. Joe Touch, Eliot Lear and
A. Zimmermann, “Service name and transport protocol port number reg-
istry,” IANA, 2016.
[23] M. Roughan, S. Sen, O. Spatscheck, and N. Duffield, “Class-of-service map-
ping for qos: a statistical signature-based approach to ip traffic classification,”
in Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measure-
ment. ACM, 2004, pp. 135–148.




[26] “ntopng,” ”http://www.ntop.org/products/traffic-analysis/ntop”, NTOP,
2016.
[27] S. Alcock and R. Nelson, “Libprotoident: traffic classification using
lightweight packet inspection,” WAND Network Research Group, Tech. Rep,
2012.
[28] “Cloudshield (lookingglass,” ”https://www.lookingglasscyber.com”, Look-
ingGlass, 2016.
[29] “Netflow traffic analyzer,” ”http://www.solarwinds.com/netflow-traffic-
analyzer”, Solarwinds, 2016.
[30] “Network based application recognition,” ”http://www.cisco.com”, CISCO,
2016.
[31] P. Haffner, S. Sen, O. Spatscheck, and D. Wang, “Acas: automated construc-
tion of application signatures,” in Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM
workshop on Mining network data. ACM, 2005, pp. 197–202.
[32] B.-C. Park, Y. J. Won, M.-S. Kim, and J. W. Hong, “Towards automated
application signature generation for traffic identification,” in Network Opera-
tions and Management Symposium, 2008. NOMS 2008. IEEE. IEEE, 2008,
pp. 160–167.
99
[33] Y. Wang, X. Yun, M. Z. Shafiq, L. Wang, A. X. Liu, Z. Zhang, D. Yao,
Y. Zhang, and L. Guo, “A semantics aware approach to automated reverse
engineering unknown protocols,” in Network Protocols (ICNP), 2012 20th
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2012, pp. 1–10.
[34] Y. Wang, Y. Xiang, W. Zhou, and S. Yu, “Generating regular expression
signatures for network traffic classification in trusted network management,”
Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 992–1000,
2012.
[35] A. Tongaonkar, R. Torres, M. Iliofotou, R. Keralapura, and A. Nucci, “To-
wards self adaptive network traffic classification,” Computer Communica-
tions, vol. 56, pp. 35–46, 2015.
[36] F. J., “Machine learning and intrusion detection: current and future direc-
tions,” in In Proceedings of the 17th National Computer Security Conference,
October 1994.
[37] J. Zhang, Y. Xiang, Y. Wang, W. Zhou, Y. Xiang, and Y. Guan, “Network
traffic classification using correlation information,” IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 104–117, 2013.
[38] J. Zhang, X. Chen, Y. Xiang, W. Zhou, and J. Wu, “Robust network traffic
classification,” IEEE/ACM transactions on networking, vol. 23, no. 4, pp.
1257–1270, 2015.
100
[39] F. Gringoli, L. Nava, A. Este, and L. Salgarelli, “Mtclass: enabling statistical
traffic classification of multi-gigabit aggregates on inexpensive hardware,”
in Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC),
2012 8th International. IEEE, 2012, pp. 450–455.
[40] C. Livadas, R. Walsh, D. Lapsley, and W. T. Strayer, “Using machine learning
techniques to identify botnet traffic,” in In 2nd IEEE LCN Workshop on
Network Security, 2006, pp. 967–974.
[41] A. Boukhtouta, N.-E. Lakhdari, S. A. Mokhov, and M. Debbabi, “Towards
fingerprinting malicious traffic,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 19, pp. 548–
555, 2013.
[42] R. Alshammari and A. N. Zincir-Heywood, “Investigating two different ap-
proaches for encrypted traffic classification,” in Privacy, Security and Trust,
2008. PST’08. Sixth Annual Conference on. IEEE, 2008, pp. 156–166.
[43] ——, “Machine learning based encrypted traffic classification: Identifying ssh
and skype.” CISDA, vol. 9, pp. 289–296, 2009.
[44] T. Nelms, R. Perdisci, and M. Ahamad, “Execscent: Mining for new c&c
domains in live networks with adaptive control protocol templates,” in Pre-
sented as part of the 22nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security
13), 2013, pp. 589–604.
[45] G. Gu, R. Perdisci, J. Zhang, and W. Lee, “Botminer: clustering analysis of
network traffic for protocol- and structure-independent botnet detection,” in
101
Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium, ser. SS’08. Berke-
ley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2008, pp. 139–154.
[46] G. Gu, J. Zhang, and W. Lee, “Botsniffer: Detecting botnet command and
control channels in network traffic.” in NDSS. The Internet Society, 2008.
[47] F. Tegeler, X. Fu, G. Vigna, and C. Kruegel, “Botfinder: Finding bots in
network traffic without deep packet inspection,” in Proceedings of the 8th in-
ternational conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies.
ACM, 2012, pp. 349–360.
[48] C. Rossow and C. J. Dietrich, “Provex: Detecting botnets with encrypted
command and control channels,” in Detection of Intrusions and Malware,
and Vulnerability Assessment. Springer, 2013, pp. 21–40.
[49] G. Gu, P. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, M. Fong, and W. Lee, “Bothunter: detect-
ing malware infection through ids-driven dialog correlation,” in Proceedings
of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium, ser.
SS’07. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2007, pp. 12:1–12:16.
[50] R. Perdisci, W. Lee, and N. Feamster, “Behavioral clustering of http-based
malware and signature generation using malicious network traces.” in NSDI,
2010, pp. 391–404.
[51] X. Wang, W. Qiu, and R. H. Zamar, “Clues: A non-parametric clustering
method based on local shrinking,” Computational Statistics & Data Analysis,
vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 286–298, 2007.
102
[52] D. Pelleg, A. W. Moore et al., “X-means: Extending k-means with efficient
estimation of the number of clusters.” in ICML, vol. 1, 2000.
[53] J. Newsome, B. Karp, and D. Song, “Polygraph: Automatically generat-
ing signatures for polymorphic worms,” in Security and Privacy, 2005 IEEE
Symposium on. IEEE, 2005, pp. 226–241.
[54] M. Z. Rafique and J. Caballero, “Firma: Malware clustering and network sig-
nature generation with mixed network behaviors,” in International Workshop
on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection. Springer, 2013, pp. 144–163.
[55] R. Perdisci, D. Ariu, and G. Giacinto, “Scalable fine-grained behavioral clus-
tering of http-based malware,” Computer Networks, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 487–
500, 2013.
[56] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, “Tor : the second-generation
onion router,” in Proceedings of the 13th Usenix Security Symposium, August
2004.
[57] A. Panchenko, L. Niessen, A. Zinnen, and T. Engel, “Website fingerprinting
in onion routing based anonymization networks,” in Proceedings of the 10th
annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, ser. WPES ’11.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 103–114.
[58] M. Liberatore and B. N. Levine, “Inferring the source of encrypted http
connections,” in Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and
103
communications security, ser. CCS ’06. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2006,
pp. 255–263.
[59] V. Roussev, “Hashing and data fingerprinting in digital forensics,” Computing
in Science and Engineering, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 49–55, 2009.
[60] M. O. Rabin et al., Fingerprinting by random polynomials. Center for Re-
search in Computing Techn., Aiken Computation Laboratory, Univ., 1981.
[61] R. M. Karp and M. O. Rabin, “Efficient randomized pattern-matching al-
gorithms,” IBM Journal of Research and Development, vol. 31, no. 2, pp.
249–260, 1987.
[62] U. Manber et al., “Finding similar files in a large file system.” in Usenix
Winter, vol. 94, 1994, pp. 1–10.
[63] S. Brin, J. Davis, and H. Garcia-Molina, “Copy detection mechanisms for
digital documents,” in ACM SIGMOD Record, vol. 24, no. 2. ACM, 1995,
pp. 398–409.
[64] A. Z. Broder, S. C. Glassman, M. S. Manasse, and G. Zweig, “Syntactic
clustering of the web,” Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, vol. 29, no. 8,
pp. 1157–1166, 1997.
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